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“Animals without reason neither see, nor believe 
that they see, any defect in the conduct of their common 
affairs; but any group of men, includes a large number 
who suppose themselves cleverer than the rest, and 
make attempts to change things, and they differ among 
themselves and try different things, and that is 
dissension and civil war”. 
~ Hobbes ~ 
 
 
“The point of departure is order, which alone can 
produce freedom. Without order the appeal to freedom is no 
more than the quest of some specific party for its special 
objectives, and will in practice always lead to tyranny…I have 
always considered despotism of any kind a symptom of 
weakness. Where it appears, it condemns itself; most 
intolerably where it appears behind the mask of advancing the 
cause of freedom”. 
~ Metternich ~ 
 
 
“To construct in order to demolish; to take upon 
ourselves the hopeless task of rolling the stone of Sisyphus 
uphill, only to let it role back down again: such is the 
industrious folly which characterizes our race”.  
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Kant’s repudiation of revolution and of a right of rebellion is unequivocal. In 
the body of his political writings
1
 he affirms with vehemence that “all resistance 
against the supreme legislative power”, and “all defiance which breaks out into 
rebellion” is “the greatest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth, for it 
destroys its very foundations”, adding that “this prohibition is absolute”.2 
 
Indeed he rejects the procedures of the “political revolutionaries”, for the 
coming about of radical political change make “all lawful constitutions insecure and 
produce a state of complete lawlessness where all rights cease at least to be 
effectual”.3 Finally, Kant concedes that it is certainly a “pleasant dream” to think of 
better constitutions that exist in harmony with the principles of right, but “it is 
foolhardy to put them forward seriously”, and in the highest degree “punishable” to 




Contrary to the conclusive character of Kant’s position, his views were 
received by his contemporaries with bewilderment and even consternation. For Kant’s 
“radical followers”5, a rejection of a right of resistance contradicted the precious 
Kantian principles of moral freedom, self-government and anti-paternalism they had 
gladly welcomed. According to Erhard, the question of a right of rebellion “belongs 
therefore alone in the court of morality, and the right to start a revolution cannot be 
positively given or taken away”.6 
 
                                                        
1
 The writings in question, and the translations used in this study are: “Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (1784) [henceforth “Idea”], trans. H. B. Nisbet in Kant's Political 
Writings ed. H. S. Reiss (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991); "An Answer to the Question: 
'What Is Enlightenment?'" (1784) [henceforth "What is Enlightenment?"], trans. Nisbet in Reiss; "On 
the Common Saying: 'This May Be True In Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice'" (1793) 
[henceforth "Theory and Practice"], trans. Nisbet in Reiss; “Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch” 
(1795) [henceforth “Perpetual Peace”], trans. Nisbet in Reiss; The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 
(1798) [henceforth “Doctrine of Right”], trans. J. Ladd (Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, 
1999); and The Contest of Faculties (1798) [henceforth “Contest of the Faculties”], trans. Nisbet in 
Reiss. All references will be given to the pagination in Kant’s Political Writings, except otherwise 
noted. References to the Academy edition are given only for the Doctrine of Right. 
2
 Theory and Practice, p. 81 
3
 Ibid., p. 82 
4
 Contest of the Faculties, p. 188n 
5
 I am here following Reidar Malik’s (2012) Cf. Malik (2012) ‘Revolutionary Epigones: Kant and his 
Radical Followers’ History of Political Thought, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4.  
6
 Erhard, Uber das Recht zu einer Revolution (1795) in Malik (2012) p. 660 
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Thus, for this group of “left-Kantians”, 7  the philosophy of freedom as 
autonomy embodied an inherent call for its realization in our social and political 
institutions. On this understanding, revolution had to be justified in order to make, in 
Schiller’s words, “true freedom the basis of political association”.8  Surprisingly, this 
initial reaction still resonates in recent interpretations of Kant’s political philosophy. 
In the current literature on Kant’s political thought, it is quite common to contest the 
philosopher’s views on revolution with a sore tone of discontent.   
 
In general, this debate has led some to argue that Kant actually “never wrote” 
a political philosophy,
9
 or to wonder why Kant “had a political philosophy at all”, 
while at the same time making efforts to articulate a so-called “politics-
accommodating Kantianism”.10 Other critics assert that Kant’s political ideas “were 
revolutionary for his age”11, such that he deserved the incontestable title of “the 
philosopher of the French Revolution”,12 leading some to ask if Kant’s dictum never 
to resist the sovereign can really “be true”.13  
 
For the purposes of this study, I will refer to this group of interpreters as the 
“disappointed Kantians” 14 ,as Katrin Filkschuh has characterized them, 15  whose 
                                                        
7
 I borrow this term from Bernard Yack’s compelling analysis of the sources of modern social 
discontent, which he traces back to Kant’s critical philosophy. Cf. Yack, B. (1992) The Longing for 
Total Revolution. Philosophical Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche 
University of California Press: California. 
8
 Aesthetic Education; Schiller in Yack (1992) p. 103 
9
 Arendt, H. (1981) Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 
p. 31 
10
 Riley, P. (2007) ‘Kant Against Hobbes in Theory and Practice’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, No. 
2, p. 199 
11
 Reiss, H. (1956) ‘Kant and the Right of Rebellion’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 17, No.2, p. 
182 
12
 Reiss, H. (1991) Kant’s Political Writings Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 3 
13
 Schwarz W. (1977) ‘The Ambiguities of Resistance: A Reply to Nicholson’, Ethics, Vol. 87, No 3, p. 
255 
14
 I take the “disappointed Kantians” to be a group of recent interpretations which, in various ways, 
have sought to make compatible Kant’s strict views against revolution with other aspects of his moral 
philosophy, in order to excuse him of alleged contradictions, or to ameliorate the patent tensions 
between his moral and political philosophy more generally. See Korsgaard, C. (1997) ‘Taking The Law 
into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right of Revolution’, in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for 
John Rawls Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; Byrd, B. S & Hruschka, J. (2008) 'From the State 
of Nature to the Juridical State of States’, Law and Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 6; Maliks, R. (2013) 
‘Kant, the State, and Revolution’, Kantian Review, Vol. 18, no 1; Westphal, K. (1992) ‘Kant on the 
State, Law, and Obedience to Authority in the Alleged Anti-Revolutionary Writings.’ Journal of 
Philosophical Research No. 17; Cummiskey, D. (2010) ‘Justice and Revolution in Kant’s Political 
Philosophy’ in Rethinking Kant Ed. Pablo Muchnik, Vol II Cambridge Scholar Publishers: Cambridge 
MA. 
15
 Flikschuh, K. (2008) ‘Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 
36, no. 4, p. 397 
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position is captured in the claim that: “The Kantian principle of autonomy is the 
ground that stands under, but should not be buried under, the principle of political 
obedience”, so if revolutions are necessary to safeguard autonomy, obedience must be 
overstepped, “whether Kant likes it or not”.16 
 
However, it is the main thesis of this study that there is a clearly detectable, 
and unambiguously endorsed, critique of revolution in Kant’s political writings. This 
critique involves a repudiation of revolution that is deeply Kantian, both in its 
motivations and in the breath of its conclusions.  My thesis is based on three further 
claims: first, I will argue that Kant’s views on revolution are answerable to his 
particular conception of the problem of politics as the reconciliation between order 
and freedom; second, that his critique of revolution is based on what I call Kant’s 
‘Hobbesian commitments’; and finally, that Kant’s political thought more generally is 
an exception to Reinhard Koselleck’s thesis, according to which the Enlightenment 
sleepwalked from critique to crisis, without realizing that revolution meant civil 
war,
17
 thus making Kant, contrary to other Enlighteners, a responsible political 
philosopher who was deeply concerned about the likely outcome of political change. 
 
Here I depart from those who sought in Kant’s political philosophy a source 
for radical and revolutionary conclusions. On this I have followed Bernard Yack’s 
view, according to which the conceptual innovations inaugurated by Kant’s 
philosophy, epitomized in the dichotomy between freedom as autonomy and natural 
necessity, was the original source that “shaped the development of radical social 
thought in the nineteenth century.
18
  
According to Yack, the discontent of this group is based on their shared 
conviction that: “Man is justified in rejecting all political institutions that do not 
embody the capacity for autonomy that Kant’s critiques have rendered irrefutable”.19 
The coming about of new social and political structures better fitted to the claim of 
the realization of autonomy, was thus the germen of their disappointment. The 
revolutionary implications of these seminal thoughts, contrary to what Kant himself 
                                                        
16
 Cummiskey, D. (2010) ‘Justice and Revolution in Kant’s Political Philosophy’ in Rethinking Kant 
Ed. Pablo Muchnik, Vol II Cambridge Scholar Publishers: Cambridge MA, p. 241. 
17
 Koselleck R. (1988) Critique and Crisis, The MIT Press: Cambridge MA, p. 1. 
18
 Reynolds, C. (1987) ‘Review: The Longing for Total Revolution. Bernard Yack’, Soundings: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 70, No. 3/4, p. 557 
19
 Yack (1992) p. 102 
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intended as consequences of their innovative power, were appropriated by the “left-
Kantians” such as Schiller, Schelling, and the young Hegel, 20  as well as Jakob, 
Erhard, Schlegel, and the early Fichte.
21
 
Although I will not discuss the plausibility of Yack’s overall thesis, whose 
merits have been an important influence and intellectually rewarding for my thinking 
on these issues, I will argue for the strong connection that seems to be present 
between this general outlook on Kant’s political thought, and more recent 
interpretations that try to make compatible Kant’s rejection of a right of rebellion, 
with his notion of self- rule and his optimistic teleology. 
 
This study then, will offer a contribution to this debate in the form of a close 
analysis and reconstruction of the texts, as well as a personal interpretation of Kant’s 
views on the issue of revolution. In intimating with Kant’s political writings, I have 
evidenced the pivotal role the problem of revolution plays in his political philosophy, 
as a point of convergence of the indissoluble tensions between authority and 
obedience, order and freedom, and right and autonomy.  
 
This nest of problems motivated me to understand the deepness of Kant’s 
reasons for a categorical repudiation of revolutions. More specifically, I explain 
Kant’s critique of revolution on the basis of several commitments: a pessimistic view 
of human nature, a belief on the fragility of the juridical condition as the sphere of 
“civil security” (Bürgerlichen Sicherheit),22 a mistrust on the collective action of the 
masses, a limited view of participatory politics, a rejection of popular sovereignty, 
and a stance in favor of positive law and authority to settle conflicts of right.  I have 
traced back the lineage of these commitments to the influence of Hobbes.  
 
Thus, in what follows, I depart from those who think that there is a “break”23 
in Kant’s political thought, either in terms of an improvement from a previous 
position
24 , or as Ernst Bloch observes, a regression “to a position before the 
                                                        
20
 C.f. Yack (1992) pp. 89-132 
21
 Malik’s (2012)  “radical Kantians”, p. 647 
22
 Contest of the Faculties, p. 230 
23 Heller, A. (1984) ‘La Primera y la Segunda Etica Kantiana’ in Crítica de la Ilustración. Las 
Antinomias Morales de la Razón. Península: Barcelona. 
24
 Cf. L.W. Beck (2002) Selected Essays on Kant. Ed. Hoke Robinson. University of Rochester Press: 
Rochester; Byrd, S. & Hruschka, J. (2008) 
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eighteenth or even sixteenth century with respect to penal and civil law”.25 I think that 
in reference to the problem of revolution and its corollaries, Kant maintained a 
consistent view both before and after the events of 1789, which allow us to see him as 
a moderate Enlightened thinker,
26
 contrary to the political irresponsibility that 
Koselleck prefigures in that period.  
 
In the end, I conclude that Kant’s anti-revolutionary credentials are well 
founded in the explicit content of his writings, but more importantly, at the level of 
the commitments that ground his political philosophy. I contend that the cement that 
holds in place the various components of Kant’s critique of revolution is made of a 
fundamentally Hobbesian material.
27
 I finally claim that Kant’s attempt at the 
reconciliation between order and freedom reflects his particular position as a political 
thinker in the wider spectrum of the Enlightenment. I thus hope that the present 
analysis of his critique of revolution, both of its causes and its consequences, does not 















                                                        
25
 Bloch, E. (1987) Natural Law and Human Dignity The MIT Press: Cambridge, p. 66 
26
 I broadly agree with Jonathan Israel’s description of a strand of “moderate Enlightenment” as 
distinct from a conservative and a radical one. I expand on this in Chapter 3, section 3.1 ‘Kant and the 
Enlightenment’. Cf. Israel, J. (2001) Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 
1650-1750 Oxford University Press: Oxford. See Introduction, and Part II, chap. 15 ‘Philosophy, 
Politics, and the Liberation of Man’. 
27
 All references to Hobbes will made to On the Citizen (1998) [henceforth De Cive] trans. Richard 
Tuck, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, and Leviathan (2005) [henceforth Leviathan] trans. 
Richard Tuck, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
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Chapter I: Kant and the Problem of Politics 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore Kant’s definition of the problem of 
politics, which he considers “the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human 
race”.28 I argue that this problem should be understood in Kant as the reconciliation 
between order and freedom. I proceed by tracing this claim back to Kant’s writings 
before and after 1789, in order to give evidence of the plausibility of my definition. I 
continue to show that Kant’s particular conception of politics is at the basis of his 
critique of revolution. The complexity of Kant’s critique of revolution can be better 
understood as being answerable to the fundamental problem posed by politics. I 
finally discuss the consequences that Kant’s views on politics, and his repudiation of 
revolution, had for his radical followers at his time, as well as for some of his 
contemporary interpreters. I conclude that such a definition of the problem of politics 
demanded a repudiation of revolution, leaving some of his followers with alleged 
reasons for disappointment.  
 
1.1. The animal who needs a master: the initial formulation 
 
Politics becomes a problem for Kant as early as his Idea for a Universal 
History of 1783, and continues to be a concern in his post-1789 political writings. 
There is a remarkable continuity in the way he defines the problem of politics, and 
also an evolution in his discussion of the possible solution to it. Several aspects of 
Kant’s early treatment need to be emphasized from the outset: first, Kant 
acknowledges the inherent complexity of the nature of this problem, one that tries to 
reconcile individual freedom with external authority; second, he also says that a 
perfect solution to the problem is impossible; third, these assertions operate with an 
unequivocally realist, pessimistic view of human nature, according to which man does 
not recognize the limits that others impose on his freedom but “certainly abuses his 
freedom in relation to others of his own kind”.29  
 
On the basis of these premises, Kant first sketches the problem of politics in 
two stages: One, we human beings are free but tend to abuse our freedom; and two, as 
                                                        
28
 Idea, p. 46 
29
 Ibid., p. 46; 49  
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a consequence of the obstacles we find for coexisting with others, “man is an animal 
who needs a master”.30 
 
Kant develops a view of man not as he ought to act but as he actually does act, 
motivated by “the desire for honor, power or property”, which drives him to seek 
status among his fellows, “whom he cannot bear yet cannot bear to leave”31. Man, 
Kant writes, is “enamoured with unrestrained freedom”, and therefore his entering 
into the civil union is an action done under pressure: man is “forced to enter this state 
of restriction by sheer necessity”, a necessity imposed by men upon themselves in that 
their inclinations make it impossible for them to exist side by side for long “in a state 
of wild freedom”.32  
 
It should be noted that the basic structure of this initial formulation of 1784, 
defined in terms of the limits of freedom and the need for authority, accompanies 
Kant in his later works on Perpetual Peace (1795) and up to the more comprehensive 
arguments of the Doctrine of Right (1797).
33
 In these works, Kant expands on the role 
of our interests and inclinations, on our tendency to abuse our freedom, and on the 
identity between right, authority, and coercion to enable the conditions for the co-
existing freedom of all. However, the initial formulation remains untouched.  
 
I contend that from these initial remarks, Kant’s definition of the problem of 
politics can then be stated as the reconciliation of freedom and order; in other words, 
as the creation of a civil union in which man’s tendency to live as an individual, 
pursuing his inclinations and his interests, can be “enclosed within a precinct” in 
which “freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible 
extent with irresistible force”.34  
 
In following this point, a clarification is important. I understand order here as 
having, for Kant, a particular aim, form, and status. The aim of political order, the one 
in question in his formulation of the problem of politics, is the establishment and 
protection of what he calls “civil security”; the form of such an order is defined by 
                                                        
30
 Idea, p. 46 
31




 Cf. Perpetual Peace, pp. 112-113; Doctrine of Right, Introduction §D; §45; §49. 
34
 Idea, pp. 45-46 
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Kant essentially as coercion, that is, “the possibility of external coercion that is 
compatible with the freedom of everyone”;35 and finally the status of order is one of 
fragility and constant threat.  
 
Taken together, these claims allow us to offer two different senses of order: in 
a narrow sense, order is for Kant equivalent to law-governed, a juridical condition or 
state of affairs “that involves the conditions under which alone everyone is able to 
enjoy his right”.36 In a broader sense, order is an essentially political notion equivalent 
to power, and more specifically, with existing power.  This broader sense of order 
seems to be at work in the Doctrine of Right when Kant says:  
 
[W]hether the power (Gewalt) came first and the law only appeared after it, or 
whether they ought to have followed this order –these are completely futile arguments for 




As we will see later on in this study, the status of both senses of order is 
vulnerable, every time a revolution attempts to “suspend its effectiveness”. This Kant 
will consistently condemn as “practically a crime”.38  
  
Moreover, it is the task of politics to reconcile order and freedom, where 
freedom here is defined essentially in terms of coexistence: freedom in its external 
character as an action, or a condition that can “coexist with the freedom of everyone 
in accordance with a universal law”.39 We see that in the sphere of public right Kant is 
working with a restricted notion of individual freedom, one that assimilates 
Metternich’s reflection according to which “liberty was inseparable from authority, 
that freedom was an attribute of order”.40 This notion is rather different from freedom 
as self-rule, as the sort appraised by the “left Kantians”. 
 
As a political philosopher, Kant develops his views on the problem of order 
and freedom with the aid of a political anthropology. As in the case of Hobbes, Kant 
                                                        
35
 Doctrine of Right § E, 332 
36
 Ibid., § 41, 306 
37
 Theory of Right, General Remark A in Kant’s Political Writings, H. B Nisbet trans., p. 143, my 
emphasis. I use Nisbet’s translation here as I think it better captures the point I want to make in my 
argument. In Ladd’s translation, however, we find “authority” in the place of “power”. In the original 
German it reads: "...oder ob die Gewalt vorherging, und das Gesetz nur hintennach gekommen sei..." 
38
 Ibid,. p. 143 
39
 Doctrine of Right, § C 230 
40
 Metternich in Kissinger, H. (1957) A World Restored The Riverside Press: Cambridge, p. 191 
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does not need to state that man is evil by nature to draw a realistic picture of the 
problem he has set to solve. It can be argued that the claim that man is evil by nature 
is at the basis of Hobbes’ political philosophy, but –writes Leo Strauss—“he did not 
dare to uphold this consequence or assumption of his theory.”41  
 
Similarly, it was possible for Kant to work, and I believe he does so, with the 
weaker claim that “human beings may be evil by nature, and that this is a possibility 
which any political theory must seriously consider”. 42  This view seems to be 
confirmed by Kant’s pessimism regarding moral progress, and his consciousness of 
the uncertainty of man’s actions since his will is a “mixture of evil and goodness in 
unknown proportions, no-one can tell what effects he should expect from his own 
actions”.43 In the same section of The Contest of the Faculties, we read: 
 
In view of the frailty of human nature, and the fortuitous circumstances which can 
intensify its effects, we can expect man’s hopes of progress to be fulfilled only under the 
positive condition of a higher wisdom…and in so far as human beings can themselves 
accomplish anything or anything can be expected of them, it can only be through their 
negative wisdom in furthering their own ends.
44
   
 
 
The pessimistic outlook of man’s capacity to comply with the law, and to 
compel each other to respect the limits of freedom is a “methodological assumption”45 
present all throughout Kant’s political writings, and it is more markedly in his 
discussion on revolution, an assumption that makes a methodological link between 
human nature and coercion, that is, “that evil aspect of human nature which makes 
coercion necessary”.46 
 
1.2 The nation of devils: the separation of morality and politics. 
 
Kant’s initial formulation of the problem of politics already presents the basic 
complexity pertaining to a sphere of human action where, in his own words, “social 
incompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires for possession or 
                                                        
41
 Strauss, L. (1952) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, p. 
13 
42
 James, D. (2012) ‘The Role of Evil in Kant’s Liberalism’, Inquiry 55(3), p. 242 
43
 Contest of the Faculties, p. 181 
44
 Ibid., p. 189 
45
 James (2012) p. 246 
46
 Perpetual Peace, p. 126 
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even power” function as driving forces of action.47 To be sure, Kant recognizes that 
these motivations may foster the development of man’s natural capacities, and 
expresses the hope, not always consistently maintained in his work, that a long 
process of education will lead to higher stages of moral maturity. 
 
However, Kant takes a decisive turn in Perpetual Peace (1795) by showing 
that morality, that is, a morally good will, need not be a condition to solve the 
problem of our concern: “For such a task does not involve the moral improvement of 
man”; it only means finding out how to compel one another to the force of “coercive 
laws”, producing “a condition of peace within which the laws can be enforced”.48 
 
At this point, it becomes clear that a juridical and political order, the narrow 
and broad senses of order we have proposed, are not seen as the result of our morally, 
well-disposed, intentions to comply with coercive laws, but Kant suggests a dialectic 
that is quite the opposite: “[I]t is only through [good political constitutions] that the 
people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture.”49 Presented in these 
terms, Kant introduces here a fundamental separation between political progress and 
moral progress, that is, between politics and morality. This does not render them 
necessarily incompatible, but serves to show that a possible reconciliation between 
order and freedom must be based on the strictly external character of our relations, 
reducing morality to the private sphere of the individual, what Hobbes called the 
“foro interno”.50 
 
Moreover, this distinction fosters a new emphasis on the definition of the 
problem of politics with the aid of Kant’s notion of “unsocial sociability”.51 The 
natural mechanisms of nature and our selfish interests work together towards better 
forms of political order, and hopefully moral improvements in our species.  
 
This new dimension of the problem of politics starts sinking Hobbesian 
elements into the argument for the necessarily coercive nature of the state, in the 
context of the workings of Kant’s political anthropology. Kant’s marked realism in 
                                                        
47
 Idea, p. 45 
48
 Perpetual Peace, p. 113 
49
 Ibid., p. 113 
50
 For a detailed discussion of Hobbes’s separation between foro interno and foro externo, and its 
effects in the rise of the Enlightenment thought see Koselleck, R. (1988) Critique and Crisis, pp. 25-26 
51
 Idea, pp. 46-47 
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matters of human interests and inclinations and their effects thus becomes manifest. 
Patrick Frierson has rightly linked this issue with Kant more general similitudes with 
Hobbes; on this Frierson says that: “even without any moral interests, conflicts among 
humans will lead to find laws to which they subordinate themselves and others in 
order to achieve peace and stability necessary for the satisfaction of desires”.52 
   
At this stage, Kant acknowledges that coercive authority is required to 
produce a condition, i.e. a legal and political condition, in order for the law to be 
enforced, even if our private interests conflict with one another. However, I am not 
suggesting that the state comes into play as a mere remedy for our difficulties to 
comply with the law set by the civil condition.
 53
 I think that the way Kant frames his 
discussion here is far more interesting, and serves as the basis for his later views in 
the Doctrine of Right (1797). 
 
 Indeed, in recognizing our tendency to “secretly exempt” ourselves from the 
law that limits our freedom Kant is, in my opinion, making a point not only in respect 
to human nature in its external character, but more importantly, acknowledging the 
inherent vulnerability and fragility of institutional solutions which are subject to what 
Kruger has called “freedom’s power for evil”;54 that is, in the realm of politics, our 
tendency to antagonize and violate the limits of other people’s freedom.  
 
What emerges from the above is Kant’s re-affirmation of the claim that the 
reconciliation between order and freedom demands protecting “civil security”, by 
means of strengthening authority. This original insight paves the way for Kant’s 
ultimately authoritarian solution to the problem of politics in the Doctrine of Right, by 
conceding unequivocal legitimacy to positive law, and also proposing a passive 
notion of citizenship, a limited view of participatory politics, and an absolute 
repudiation of revolutionary action against the extant authorities. In this context I 
argue that Kant’s state is primarily aimed at the protection of the conditions for 
freedom, and not at its maximization.  
 
1. 3 Anarchy and autonomy: a challenge for Kantian Politics 
                                                        
52
 Frierson, P. (2013) What is a Human Being? Routledge: London, p. 85 
53
 This point will be discussed in Chapter II, section ‘Remedial views of justice’, in relation to Ripstein 
(2013)  
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Thus far I have argued for three main claims: first, Kant’s definition of the 
problem of politics as the reconciliation between order and freedom finds its basic 
structure in Idea, and is consistently maintained throughout his political writings. 
Second, on the basis of a negative view of human nature, and an analysis of the 
inherent fragility of the juridical and political condition, Kant is committed to 
establishing a separation between morality and politics, and a strict conception of 
freedom in its external character. Finally, this diagnosis furnishes Kant’s prioritization 
of order, in terms of a strengthening of authority. 
 
However, these suggestions are difficult to make compatible with a 
fundamental Kantian principle: the principle of autonomy. The fragility of civil 
security, subjected permanently to the pressures of our evil dispositions and 
conflicting interests is, somewhat paradoxically, related to the role of autonomy in 
Kantian ethics. The question is: how can the problem of politics as understood thus 
far involve a claim for self-legislation? Patrick Riley has described the worry thus: 
“The core of Kantian morality is a purely internal good will”, and “the core of 
Kantian politics a purely external freedom under general laws”, what amounts to an 




This problem has been identified by Steven Smith and Robert Paul Wolff,
56
 by 
arguing that the Kantian notion of autonomy can be interpreted as having the effect of 
delegitimizing all political and social institutions that are not the product of our own 
free will. For example, for Smith, such an understanding of freedom could grow into 
“a revolutionary or terroristic morality, that preaches liberation from all contexts or 
                                                        
55
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situations”, a morality leading to the rejection, as oppressive and dehumanizing, of all 
institutional arrangements that do not immediately express, from the moral agent’s 
point of view, man’s essential humanity and dignity.57  
 
I believe this to be a crucial challenge, for its obvious connections with Kant’s 
position against revolutions. Endorsing a notion of freedom that demands from our 
institutional framework to mirror in its policies, and in the interpretation and 
applicability of its laws, a conception of humanity and a value for self-rule, could 
easily be interpreted as a justification for a rebellion, called forward in the name of 
freedom. This issue emerges with particular urgency since this, in my opinion, 
misguided understanding of Kant’s notion of autonomy in connection with his politics 
has served as the basis for arguments in favor of political anarchism.  
 
For example, Wolff takes Kant’s notion of autonomy to insist on the integrity 
of individual moral judgment over the arbitrary contingencies of positive law. 
Accordingly, Kant’s concept of autonomy is a matter of duty, of taking responsibility 
for our actions, and this means that each individual moral agent must figure out for 
herself what she ought to do. For the autonomous person “there is no such thing, 
strictly speaking, as a command”, 58  and because submission to legal authority 
involves doing certain things just because the extant legal authority tells you to do 
them, it seems to follow that we are required, on the basis of Kantian autonomy, to 
reject legal authority, since “the primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to 
be ruled”. Thus, for Wolff “it would seem that anarchism is the only political doctrine 
consistent with the virtue of autonomy”.59 
 
Although the rhetoric of Wolff’s argument is far distant from the complexity 
of Kant’s definition of autonomy in his moral philosophy, the point is still pressing 
for us. This claim for self-rule, and its consequent rejection of external authorities, 
captures in a succinct manner the tension that emerges if one fails to recognize that, in 
the context of his politics, Kant had defined the problem as a reconciliation between 
legitimate coercion, or what Wolff calls de facto states “whose subjects believe to be 
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legitimate”,60 and co-existent freedom.61 
 
Moreover this conception is deepened by Kant, on the face of his commitment 
to the inscrutability of the legitimacy of sovereign authority,
62
 and the renunciation of 
the subjects to pass judgement on the ways such authority must be exercised
63
. In 
Kant’s own words: “The authority that is now here and under which you live is 
already in possession of the right legislation. Though you may indeed publicly 
discuss and debate this legislation, you cannot set yourselves up as opposing 
legislators”.64 I will argue for these claims in Chapter 2, but I think these suggestions 
can already be inferred from what we have been discussing thus far.  
 
I find that this apparent tension between Kant’s politics and a claim for self-
determination, helps to explain the source of dissatisfaction that revolves around 
Kant’s critique of revolution. 65  Once we read this critique in the light of his 
understanding of order and freedom within the political context, we are in a better 
position to scrutinize Kant’s arguments.  
 
This, whoever, was not the route transited by the radical Kantians mentioned 
in the Introduction. As Yack has argued, Kant’s dichotomy between natural necessity 
and freedom as autonomy has rendered “man a solitary”, 66 an alienated being from 
the external world, since he does not find in his natural and social interactions 
anything that mirrors his inward dignity. The paradoxical character of this 
interpretation endures in present scholarship. While it is true, as already pointed out, 
that Kant assumes that “the principles of right have an objective reality, i.e. that they 
can be applied in practice”, he acknowledges that the conflict between politics and 
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morality “in a subjective sense…will and ought to remain active, since it serves as a 
whetstone of virtue”.67 
 
1. 4 Order and freedom: Kant’s solution to the problem of politics. 
 
In the context of Kant’s political philosophy, agency is understood in its strict 
external character, a sphere in which we recognize others not as good willed 
neighbors, but as an individual with equivalent claims of right, an idea that involves 
the recognition of limits. In other words, this “act of recognition” between agents as 
political persons,
68
 in Gary Herbert’s proto-Hegelian wording, makes manifest that 
for Kant, the establishment of a sphere for “civil security”, in the form of a juridical 
condition where public law delineates the limits of the freedom of each in respect to 
the whole, is the essential pre-condition for our moral capacities to be exercised and 
not the other way round. 
 
If these suggestions are correct, we are in a better position to understand 
Kant’s definition of revolution as “the greatest and most punishable crime in a 
commonwealth”,69 in that it destroys the very conditions that enable us to develop 
more stable political institutions, and it is in the utmost way wrong by subverting the 
efforts towards a possible reconciliation between order and freedom. 
  
That this seems to be closer to Kant’s own thought has been the main focus of 
this chapter, in showing that Kant has a reasonable confidence in the possibility of co-
existent freedom within the framework of juridical and political order. This, Kant 
thinks, is better manifested in the internal and external relations of states where “the 
citizen’s inclinations to do violence to one another is counteracted by a more 
powerful force –that of the government”, a situation that “genuinely makes it much 
easier for the moral capacities of men to develop into an immediate respect for 
right”.70  
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I should mention at this point that Kant’s appeal to institutional authority and 
positive law is not aimed at a solution to a deficient picture of human nature. As I 
have argued, this picture does accompany Kant’s arguments as a methodological 
premise throughout his political writings. However, the way he conceives the sphere 
of “civil security”, namely as the fragile achievement of our duty to establish a state, 
demanded for Kant also a solution to conflicting judgments in matters of justice, in 
order to guarantee the necessary continuity of the juridical condition. Both the 
tendency to misuse our freedom, as well as the conflict between private judgments, 
had to be contained under the legality of coercion. 
 
In this context, it could be argued that an alleged right of rebellion and all 
forms of revolution involve for Kant raising a question relating to the indisputable 
content of public law, and to the legitimacy of origin of whomever holds the means of 
coercion.  Recall that Kant is explicit on this point when he says that: 
 
The origin of the supreme authority is, from the practical point of view, not open to 
scrutiny by the people who are subject to it; the subject should not be overly curious about its 




In addition to Kant’s recognition of an inscrutable dimension of order as 
power, i.e. order in the broader sense, an individual who calls into question “the moral 
basis of a ruler’s legitimacy” fails to notice, according to Waldron, that for Kant what 
truly matters “is that there be a civil society and that we be subject to it as soon as 
people start entering into conflict about the practical application of principles of 
justice and right”.72 Thus, the elimination of conflicting judgments on what is right 
and what is just, in addition to the inherent conflict of our antagonistic tendencies and 
interests, justified for Kant an appeal to a political solution, based on the 
“irreproachable”, and “irresistible”73 authority of the extant powers, who have in their 
hands the legitimate use and enforcement of coercion, and in the univocal voice of 




These arguments have, I think rightly, been identified by interpreters such as 
Vlachos, Philonenko, and Waldron,
75
 as an expression of the authoritarian character 
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of Kant’s solution to the problem of politics. I believe that defining Kant’s political 
philosophy in these terms is not a vacuous naming; rather it brings to the fore Kant’s 
particular position on the role of authority, his mistrust of the masses, and his 
warnings against revolutions as unleashing conflict and interrupting the continuity of 
the juridical condition.  In the context of a discussion on the benefits of 
Enlightenment, Kant makes it clear that collective action, of the kind promoted by the 
revolutionaries, if it does not respond to a change of mind is not positive evolution but 
an open door to despotism: 
 
Thus a public can only achieve enlightenment slowly. A revolution may well put an 
end to autocratic despotism and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never 
produce a true reform in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they 




In following this line of thought, Vlachos argues that in Kant, we see a 
displacement from purely normative justifications of the state to what he calls an 
“existential” justification of order, concluding that: “The legitimacy of the positive 
(existing) order of laws resides…in its existential truth and in the fusion of right and 
power.”77  As the guarantor of order, the sovereign power acquires for Kant an almost 
Hobbesian quality, for it embodies “the preservation of the state constitution”, which 
is “the highest law of a civil society as such”.78 In this context, Vlachos comes very 
close to what I think is a key point at the core of Kant’s critique of revolution, 
namely, his commitment to the claim that: “All established power, because of the fact 
that it actually exists, disposes of a certain a priori legitimacy”79  that cannot be 
contested, and least of all outstripped  through violent means.  
 
The demand for the priority of positive law, represented and enacted through 
the sovereign’s inscrutable authority, paves the way for Kant’s ultimate resolution of 
the problem of politics in the Doctrine of Right. This work, as we know, bears already 
the imprint of the French Revolution on it, but contrary to the expectations of his 
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revolutionary followers, Kant did not “revise” his theories in accordance to his 
progressive audience,
80
 but presented his most clear approbation in favor of state 
authority,
81
 a limited conception of citizenship,
82
 a minimal space for participatory 
politics,
83
 a strident doctrine of punishment
84
, and an unequivocal repudiation of 
revolution and rebellion.
85
 The disappointment is still felt in more recent 
commentators, who find the substance of this position as “unworthy of [Kant’s] own 
better thinking”.86 
 
1.5 Revolution: a political problem. 
 
To be sure, Kant’s views are controversial. However, in dealing with his 
political writings, I have found as a welcome aspect the consistency of his views and 
the persistence of his basic commitments. This consistency is markedly revealed in 
his views on revolution. In overlooking the background from which this critique 
springs, we easily lose sight of the fact that, for Kant, revolution is a political problem 
to the extent that it involves a suspension of the conditions for the reconciliation 
between order and freedom, thus introducing a vacuum of right and interrupting the 
continuity of legality and peace. 
 
Recapitulating some points previously made: firstly, Kant’s political 
philosophy works under the conviction that the task of establishing a state, for the 
protection of “civil security”, must not be made to depend on the moral improvement 
of mankind; secondly, this task is done with the aid of a methodological premise on 
the negative aspects of human nature, and a mistrust on the collective agency of “the 
great unthinking mass” who can only “achieve enlightenment slowly” 87 ; thirdly, 
Kant’s understanding of the notion of order demands a repudiation of revolution as 
radical political change, which “will never produce a true reform in ways of 
thinking”88; and finally, the solution to the problem posed by politics prefigures an 
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authoritarian response, as the one we find in the main arguments of the Doctrine of 
Right.  
  
These claims elaborate the thesis I have been defending so far: even before the 
French Revolution, Kant had already articulated the basic tenets of his position 
against radical political change, and also against a moralizing conception of politics, 
by understanding freedom in its strict external character, i.e. as co-existing freedom, 
and appealing to an institutional authority to trace and safeguard the limits of 
freedom. After the events of 1789 these tenets were not revised by Kant, as his 
revolutionary followers expected, but were rather reinforced.  
 
1. 6 The Disappointment of the Left-Kantians: Kant and the French Revolution. 
 
It could be rightly said with Ernst Bloch, that whilst the French felt the notion 
of freedom, the Germans had to conceptualize it. That seemed to be the case with the 
ways in which the effects of the French Revolution were received by Kant and the 
post-Kantians. However, contrary to his followers, for Kant the idea of individual 
freedom flagged by the revolution “could never be set to work empirically, and that 
was its special excellence” 89  The question of how to read Kant’s position on 
revolution, and more specifically, on the French Revolution, has haunted his readers 
up to the present. I will close this first chapter by arguing that one has two possible 
routes of interpretation: on the one hand, to think that there is a genuine puzzle to be 
solved between Kant’s conclusive position against revolution in his writings, and the 
Kantian-inspired ideals of moral freedom and political self-rule allegedly embodied 
by the French Revolution; or, on the other hand, to try to discover the nature of Kant’s 
critique of revolution, such that the above puzzlement loses its force, which is the 
route I am to transit in the present study. 
 
The first of these routes was the one chosen by the “left Kantians”, in their 
attempt to show that Kant’s philosophy of freedom, in its call for self-rule and rational 
criticism, was the theory most naturally fitted to the revolutionary motivations of the 
events in France. The voices of Kant’s radical followers joined to sing Schiller’s 
verses which say: “To set the law upon the throne, to honour man at last as an end in 
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himself and to make true freedom the principle of political bond”.90 Those were the 
directions about whose outcome Kant had persistently warned.  
 
This position did not seem to represent a puzzle for those who, like Fichte, to 
Schiller, to Hegel, as Yack argues: “[T]he Revolution appears more ‘Kantian’ than 
Kant’s own” reading of it.91 According to their interpretation the realization of moral 
freedom was at “stake in the fate of the Revolution”92 It is interesting to see the 
ramifications of these thoughts in the wider context of the Enlightenment era. As 
Sebastian Gardner argues, the radical strands of post-Kantian thought, which can be 
traced back to Spinoza, derived a lesson from Kant’s original insights into the nature 
of freedom as autonomy, “irrespective of [Kant’s] political limitations, with which the 
former might or might not be thought to be connected”. For the post-Kantians, the 
agenda was then to affirm freedom of “a kind that can be thought to flow down to the 
empirically real, historically concrete human subject”.93 
 
As I argue in the next chapter, I think that Kant understood that the radical 
conclusions of the sort Yack and Gardner tackle in the immediate post-Kantian 
period, were based on a participatory vision of politics, fostered in notions of popular 
sovereignty inspired by Rousseau. It is this picture, I will contend, that Kant’s critique 
of revolution was meant to oppose.  
 
It is significant to find that several of the arguments raised by the left-Kantians 
in the midst of the events in France, still resonate in current Kantian scholarship. One 
readily finds in the interpretations of, to list just two, L. W Beck and Kenneth 
Westphal,
94
 a revival of the initial puzzle between Kant’s strict views on political 
authority and moral freedom. For Westphal, for example, the tension is expressed in 
terms of a clash between “Kant’s conception of persons as ends who autonomously 
legislate for themselves”, and his “Hobbesian rejection of the right of revolution”.95 
Any possible solution to this problem would have to read into Kant’s political and 
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legal theory the possibility of “broader grounds of obligation”, that allow us to make 
obedience conditional “on the moral purposes served by membership in the state”96 
Similarly, L. W Beck formulated the problem as an inconsistency between, on the one 
hand, Kant’s “teleology of seeking to bring about the rule of law…(which may, in 
fact require not merely efforts at reform but actual violence)”, and on the other hand, 
a “formalism of obedience to the powers that be”.97  
 
Moreover, Beck acknowledges that Kant’s solution to this tension is flawed, 
thus suggesting that an answer for it must be looked for in the potential of Kant’s 
teleology, as addressed by Hegel. We see how close in spirit, as well as in letter, these 
interpretations are to those who responded to Kant’s political views. For Beck, the 
conclusion we must keep from Kant lies in “the historical demand which abrogates 
static laws and institutions when they fall significantly below the level of moral 
aspiration”.98 
  
It is not my intention here to address the specific difficulties of these 
interpretations. What I want to show is the striking continuity that permeates these 
contemporary readings of Kant’s political philosophy with the initial reaction of his 
more radical followers. Their respective accounts emphasize some aspects of Kant’s 
moral philosophy and of his philosophy of history, ignoring or underestimating the 
political content of his critique of revolution. However, even if we grant Kant’s 
enthusiastic assessment of the French Revolution as a mark of moral progress in the 
human race, one can easily be misled if these remarks are not read in conjunction with 
Kant’s immediate clarifications; there he goes on to say that this event “may be so 
filled with misery and atrocities that no right-thinking man would ever decide to make 
the same experiment again at such a price”, and that “true enthusiasm is always 
directed exclusively towards the ideal”, 99  something rather different from the 
historical event in question.  
 
Throughout this study I have found that in the context of Kant’s political 
thought, the substance of these passages in the Contest of the Faculties is far less 
illuminating and philosophically rich than the content one uncovers in his critique of 
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revolution, disseminated throughout his work. I have thus taken a different route to 
deal with these issues, by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of Kant’s critique 
of revolution. I depart from the intentions that furnished the agenda of both the left-
Kantians, as described by Yack, as well as the disappointed Kantians as pictured in 
the Introduction, and represented among others by L. W Beck and K. Westphal. That 
there exist tensions between Kant’s notion of freedom as autonomy and his stance in 
favor of political authority is undeniable. Yet my purpose is to show that this was not 
a puzzle for Kant, as he conceived the reconciliation of order and freedom in a 
different way from the one expected, or wished for, by his radical and disappointed 
followers. 
 
Taken together, these claims fashion what I take to be the background of 
Kant’s Hobbesian critique of revolution, as well as the most adequate way to render it 
consistent with Kant’s conception of the problem of politics. That this reconciliation 
demands a repudiation of revolution, and that Kant acknowledges this by offering a 









Chapter II: Kant’s Critique of Revolution 
 
In this Chapter, I reconstruct and interpret Kant’s arguments against 
revolution. My discussion aims at providing a careful examination of the nature and 
scope of Kant’s critique of revolution and his anti-rebellion stance, and to show that 




 A closer look into Kant’s diagnosis of revolution reveals that he 
engaged with it as a distinct and clearly detectable political problem, namely, that of 
the dangers of radical political change to the stability and continuity of the juridical 
condition. I proceed by presenting Kant’s Hobbesian commitments, which I argue lie 
at the basis of his critique. Finally, I contend that the Hobbesian undercurrents of 
Kant’s views on revolution allow us to interpret his arguments as a coherent whole. I 
conclude that Kant’s critique of revolution is essentially a response to the problem of 
politics as the reconciliation of order and freedom argued for in Chapter 1. Taken 
together, then, these two chapters provide the substance of my argument for the 
existence and consistency of a critique of revolution in Kant’s political philosophy. 
 
2. 1 Revolution: definition of an extreme case. 
 
What is revolution for Kant, and why is it a problem? 
 
The closer we get to a strict definition of revolution appears in §52 of the 
Doctrine of Right, where Kant says: “[R]evolution under an already existing 
constitution means the destruction of all relationships governed by civil right, and 
thus of right altogether. And this is not a change but a dissolution of the civil 
constitution.”101 
 
Back in Theory and Practice we read that the procedures followed by the 
political revolutionaries, if made into a maxim, “make all lawful constitutions 
insecure and produce a state of complete lawlessness (status naturalis) where all 
rights cease to be effectual”. This lawless state is equated by Kant with a “state of 
anarchy”, since the existing constitution has been destroyed and a new one has still to 
be established.
102
 Finally, the definition is made more precise when Kant concludes 
that the essential mark of this event is the “violent overthrow” of a previously existing 
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government, thus taking the people back “to an intervening moment when the entire 
juridical state of affairs would be annihilated”.103   
 
With these definitions in hand, I take Kant’s conception of revolution as 
radical political change to be based on three claims: first, revolutions are radical in 
the sense that they destroy the effectiveness of the fabric of external relations based 
on legal claims of right. Second, revolutions are radical to the extent that they bring 
about a complete new situation by dissolving the previous constitution. And thirdly, 
revolutions put a radical stop to the continuity and stability of the civil condition, 
resulting in an interval of anarchy.   
 
It is important to make a distinction here between Kant’s critique of 
revolution, on one side, and his denial of a right of rebellion on the other side. To be 
sure, the two points are connected, but they are not the same. Kant’s repudiation of 
revolution is what leads him to condemn other political methods such as rebellion, 
sedition, subversion, and conspiracy
104
 that may open the way to revolution as radical 
political change. Thus I will consider Kant’s specific arguments against rebellion in 
connection with the general definition of revolution. 
 
Before we embark on discussing Kant’s arguments for these definitions, I 
want to clarify some points. As I read the issue, Kant’s critique of revolution is not a 
mere diagnosis of why revolutions are wrong either legally, or morally, nor a 
condemnation of a historical event, which, he insists should never repeat itself.
105
 
Revolution is a comprehensive problem to the extent that it tells us something about, 
or makes explicit, the features of the complex mechanisms of the social order, and the 
difficulty of reconciling order and freedom in the context of politics. 
 
The impact of the French Revolution in Kant and his contemporaries is well 
known, and it is reason enough to speculate about its influence on their philosophical 
and political concerns. In Kant’s particular case, his political writings show plenty of 
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evidence that this event represented a persistent concern, which is found in the 
extensive discussions dedicated to revolution in his work from 1793 to 1798. What is 
most interesting, however, is the way in which this issue takes preeminence in Kant as 
a pivotal point of convergence of the most basic commitments of his political thought.  
 
Kant carried out his views on revolution in the midst of a variety of 
discussions; therefore, in order to trace a concrete definition of the problem and its 
corollaries, one has to carry out a fair amount of reconstruction. In doing this, I find 
that Kant did not offer a straightforward analysis of the causes that provoke a 
revolution, but rather the substance of his critique lies in what he took to be the 
consequences and the outcomes this phenomenon bears for the continuity of the 
juridical condition, the destruction of the limits of freedom, and the stability of civil 
security.  
 
 I understand Kant’s critique of revolution as being two-fold: on the one hand, 
it is a negative critique of popular conceptions of sovereignty that favor radical 
change and collective action; and on the other hand, it embodies a positive call for the 
preservation, continuity, and security of the basic form of government, favoring 
progressive improvements through state reforms and the popular enlightenment of the 
people. 
 
Another way to express the importance this problem had for Kant is by means 
of Leo Strauss’s definition of the “extreme case”.106 According to Strauss, political 
doctrines like those of Machiavelli and Hobbes, depart from a commitment to an 
experience that “is more revealing of the roots of civil society and therefore of its true 
character than is the normal case”, showing what holds good in “emergency 
situations”.107  In my view, this is a fruitful way of understanding the way Kant 
approaches the issue of revolution, and explains why he paid close attention to it. 
 
As an “extreme case” in the Straussian sense, Kant read revolutions as the 
dissolution of the political and juridical fabric, but not because it is extreme this event 
becomes less expected or improbable. On the contrary, we should understand here 
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“extreme” in the sense that revolutions represent a clear instantiation of a case where 
the ultimate foundations of statehood, and the mechanisms that hold together the civil 
condition more broadly, are radically suspended. To be even more specific, we are 
able to take revolutions as an extreme case in two senses: in a positive sense, this case 
enables us to theorize, from the perspective of our philosophical commitments, the 
conception and role we assign to the state and to the individuals that are subject to it; 
and in a negative sense, taking revolution as a phenomena worth examining allows us 
to analyze the consequences this event might have for the civil condition, in the 
likelihood of its occurrence. I have found that these methodological approaches are 
shared by Kant and Hobbes. 
 
2.2 The Hobbesian commitments: 
 
Kant’s arguments against revolution as an “extreme case” are in my view very 
close to Hobbes’s. I have found a remarkable similarity in the conclusions that both 
Kant and Hobbes derived from this problem, as well as in the commitments that drive 
their respective outlooks on the issue of revolution. 
 
Thus, Kant’s views on revolution are largely shaped by what I call Kant’s 
‘Hobbesian commitments’. However, this does not mean that Kant is committed to 
Hobbes’s absolutist remedy to the problem of political obedience, nor to a conception 
of the state as the one envisaged by Hobbes in De Cive and Leviathan. What is 
Hobbesian about the Kantian critique of revolution is the affinity in their 
commitments to: first, a negative anthropology, based on a pessimistic assessment of 
the intentions and dispositions of human nature in the political sphere. Second, 
Hobbes and Kant share a similar perception concerning the fragility of order in the 
narrow and broad sense described in Chapter 1. For these philosophers, the stability 
and continuity of the civil condition take priority, for it is through this stability that 
civil security is possible. Third, they also share a commitment to a view favoring the 
alienation of sovereignty in the extant authorities, in contradistinction to popular 
conceptions of sovereign power. The immediate corollary of this claim implies a 
transfer of the subject’s judgment on how power should be exercised by the sovereign 
in question. Fourthly, there is a crucial point of contact in that both Kant and Hobbes 
emphasize the importance of popular enlightenment as a means for the consolidation 
of the civil condition, the progressive eradication of seditious and revolutionary ideas, 
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and, particularly for Kant, for the development of a responsible public use of reason. 
Finally, I think it can reasonably be argued that Kant shares with Hobbes a view on 
the significance of the “extreme case” in politics.108  In Hobbes, for example, the 
experience of the extreme case is that of civil war in the state of nature, whereas in 
Kant revolution becomes a particularly illuminating instance of such extreme case. To 
be precise, the way Kant frames his arguments against revolution makes it an instance 
which reveals that when “the social fabric has dissolved”,109 it emerges more clearly 
that the civil condition is fragile, and needs to be kept protected within the boundaries 
of order. 
 
There is an advantage in reading Kant in conjunction with Hobbes, for it 
enables us to see more clearly the grounds for his specific arguments against 
revolution. Throughout the discussion, I will not defend the aforementioned 
commitments one by one; I am presupposing them as methodological premises for my 
interpretation of Kant’s general critique of revolution. I hope that the substance of 
Kant’s Hobbesian commitments manifests itself in the content and the spirit of the 
arguments themselves.  My aim is thus to formalize these commitments into a set of 






2.3 The arguments: 
 
2.3.1 The argument from anarchy: 
 
I think that there is a key assumption underlying Kant’s critique of revolution. 
Understood as radical political change, revolution incorporates a new condition to 
Kant’s political horizon: a state of anarchy. This state must be differentiated from the 
state of nature since, for Kant, a state of nature is one in which right claims remain 
provisional
110
, in the absence of an arbiter to sanction controversies in the form of a 
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Law. This state is a society, yet one where “justice is absent (status iustitiae 
vacuus)”.111  
  
Interestingly, Kant does not appeal to the idea of a state of anarchy as a 
hypothetical device –in the manner of some strands in social contract theories-, but 
rather understands it as an inevitable consequence of his views on revolution. This 
condition is one in which there is a vacuum of right, but more importantly, it is a 
condition of injustice due to its origins in violence, thus reintroducing the insecurity 
proper of the state of nature, with the caveat of political uncertainty and a latent state 
of war.  
 
Perhaps the most precise formulation of this thought can be elicited from what 
seems to be a direct reference to the Terror of the French Revolution. In a note to 
Theory and Practice, Kant states that, when the existing constitution has been 
destroyed by the people, a new commonwealth “still has to be organized”. In that 
interval of time, which is Kant’s major concern: 
 
The state of anarchy supervenes, with all the terror it may bring with it…The wrong 
which is thereby done is done by each fraction of the people to the others, as is clear from the 
case where the rebellious subjects ended up by trying to thrust upon each other a constitution 





Here Kant draws a direct link between revolutionary upheaval and anarchy, 
which in my opinion bears witness to his commitment to an essentially pessimistic 
conception of human beings, in their tendency to abuse their freedom and the effects 
this has on the social fabric. However, this permanent struggle, which was solely 
latent in the state of nature, becomes manifest in an extreme fashion in the state of 
anarchy. For this reason, I think there is a solid case to be made for an intimate 
connection between Kant’s state of anarchy as the result of revolutions, and Hobbes’s 
picture of a state of nature as the war of all against all.
113
 Moreover, Kant shares with 
Hobbes that “experience teaches us that human beings live in violence and are prone 
to fight one another before the advent of external compulsive legislation”114, as well 
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as the view according to which those hostilities need not be actual, as in Hobbes’s 
war of wolves, to make lawful coercion necessary.  
 
However, Kant’s notion of the state of nature is not exempt from ambiguities. 
He sometimes refers to it as, precisely, “a state of war”, for “even if it does not 
involve actual hostilities, it involves a constant threat of them breaking out. Thus the 
state of peace must be formally instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself 
a guarantee of peace.”115 In the same fashion, Hobbes says that: “[T]he nature of War, 
consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the 
time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE”.116 
 
What is noticeable in these remarks is that Kant recognizes that the situation in 
which the revolutionaries find themselves in, once they have overthrown the 
constitution, is marked by uncertainty and permanent risk war. What I think Kant is 
trying to emphasize is the relapse into a condition which society at large has made so 
many efforts to abandon. Following the thread of this suggestion, Kant is closer to 
Pufendorf’s description of the inimical state of uncertainty –and thus, of anarchy-, 
that individuals find themselves in the absence of a juridical state.  In On the Duty of 
Man (1663), Pufendorf says: 
 
[W]e have to regard any man who is not our fellow-citizen, or whom we live in a 
state of nature, not indeed as our enemy, but as a friend we cannot wholly rely on….Hence in 
the natural state there is a lively and all but perpetual play of suspicion, distrust, eagerness to 
subvert the strength of others.
117
 
That kind of anarchy is a clear and possible state of affairs in Kant’s political 
philosophy, and is further confirmed in the following statement: “For any legal 
constitution, even if it is only in small measure lawful, it is better that none at all, and 
the fate of a premature reform would be anarchy”. 118  This is a highly revealing 
passage that conveys at least two basic Kantian premises: a separation between 
legality and justness on the one side, and an unequivocal connection between radical 
modes of political change, be these premature reforms on the part of politicians, or 
radical violence on the part of the revolutionaries, with the coming about of a state of 
anarchy. From these premises we can readily draw a further conclusion, namely that 
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the minimal or questionable sense of justice of current constitutions, should never 
serve as a reason to challenge the status of their legality and their effectiveness.  
 
However, it is equally notable that the status of the claim according to which 
Kant sees anarchy as the “fate” of all revolutions is harder to establish. We could read 
this as a consequence of Kant’s general conservatism in politics, marked by an 
unwillingness to risk the known for the unknown. Yet in my view, this responds to a 
deeper commitment to slow reform in the place of radical attempts for political 
progress. Surely, the reader could be dissatisfied with the general tenor of Kant’s 
position here, but this does not render it less consistent; as Kersting has rightly 
argued: “Progressive violence is unthinkable for Kant”.119  
 
The spirit of these remarks seems to be very close to Edmund Burke’s 
cautious defense of reform in the face of the uncertainty of anarchy: 
 
It is thus with all those, who, attending only to the shell and husk of history, think 
they are waging war with intolerance, pride and cruelty, whilst, under colour of abhorring the 
ill principles of antiquated parties, they are authorizing and feeding the same odious vices in 





Kant is somewhat disingenuous when he attempts to prohibit revolution on the 
grounds that such an action would diametrically go against the “a priori in the Idea of 
a political constitution in general”121 as a concept of practical reason. However, it is 
my suggestion that if we support his formal arguments with the novelty of his remarks 
on anarchy, and with Kant’s commitment to the preservation of order, we are better 
able to grasp the depth of his critique.  
 
2.3.2 The argument from preservation: 
 
In order to solve the difficult task of setting up a state, Kant reminds us that 
transit from a state of nature into a juridical condition demands more than prudential 
political wisdom, or a suspension of hostilities.
122
 In this sense, Kant develops a 
conception of the juridical condition as a state of peace, that is highly vulnerable both 
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to internal and external threats, or in his words: “The state of peace must be formally 
instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself a guarantee of peace”,123 such 
that the head of the state is required “to maintain [the commonwealth’s] strength and 
stability both internally and against external enemies”.124 
 
On the basis of this general conception, Kant acknowledges that the formal 
institution of the reconciliation between order and freedom makes necessary the 
subsequent preservation of this condition, as well as its protection. Thus the political 
problem for Kant, as I interpret it, is strikingly similar to that of Hobbes, for whom: 
“Man vegetates in continual oscillation between the pursuit of power and the desire 
for peace; no human being can escape this movement, and raging with it is war.”125 
According to Reinhart Koselleck, the real moral-philosophical problem becomes that 
“peace is indeed desired as the highest good, but that as a mere wish it does not 
suffice to guarantee lasting peace”.126 
 
 It its barest bones, preservation is the antithesis of revolution, so one of Kant’s 
arguments against revolution springs from a basic commitment to the idea that the 
juridical condition must be subsumed under what Kersting calls “the law of continuity 
(lex continui)”, where “the preservation of continuity is the presupposition in any 
advance of right and justice”.127 
On this account, Kant’s commitment to the importance of preserving the civil 
condition is based on two claims: on the hand, the necessary mark of violence in all 
revolutions runs contrary to the republican constitution, the only one “incapable of 
bellicosity”; on the other hand, the incessant tendency of individuals to isolate 
themselves, and to encounter yet again “the unsocial characteristic of wanting to 
direct everything in accordance with his own ideas”.128 
 
Moreover, the internal and external threats I mentioned above are directly 
pointed out by Kant, when he warns that such a republican constitution “cannot itself 
be achieved by furious struggles –for civil and foreign wars will destroy whatever 
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statutory order has hitherto prevailed”.129 So, there seem to be two options for Kant: 
preserving what we have, or resorting back into what, with laborious hardship, we 
tried to leave behind. In other words, maintaining our current, flawed constitutions 
with all their limitations, in the hope of progressive emendations, or a violent return to 
a state of nature, here understood as the Kantian state of anarchy.  
 
In my view, Kant seems to be working on the presupposition that the tensions 
and antagonisms found in the state of nature remain, in the form of a threat, in the 
context of the civil condition.
130
 This claim is plausible given Kant’s insistence that 
the suspension of hostilities, in addition to our tendency to misuse our freedom, are 
not wholly eradicated in the civil condition, but tamed and controlled by means of 
coercion, as Hobbes maintained it. We must preserve our current states both from 
internal and external threats, since the inauguration of a juridical state of affairs does 
not, for Kant, represent the elimination of conflict, including “that evil aspect of 
human nature which makes coercion necessary”.131 
 
One may object here that Kant does not offer a clear distinction between 
actual forms of violence, and mere threats of violence. However, I think this 
distinction is implicit in Kant’s discussion on revolution and the consequences that an 
actual violent attack on the state may have. Kant certainly took great care to frame his 
views both as a means to an overall condemnation of violence as the way to secure 
claims of right, and as a means to show the inherent value of securing the state from 
dissolution. 
 
Sometimes these claims are explicitly endorsed; for example, it is customary 
for Kant to phrase his discussion of revolution in terms of “factions”, “violent 
overthrow” of governments, “defiance”, and “devious paths…of cunning and 
violence”.132 More specifically, Kant goes as far as to claim that “in order to preserve 
the state from catastrophe”, it might be necessary for individuals to betray someone 
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else, “even if their relationship were that of father and son”, since the “preservation of 
the state from evil is an absolute duty”.133 These remarks appear in the context of an 
interesting discussion on conflicting duties. What is clear for our purposes is the firm 
priority Kant gives to the preservation of the state, in reference to any other 
competing (relative) duties.  
 
Moreover, the preservation and continuity of the juridical condition is not an 
ungrounded valuation on Kant’s side, but part of his more general argument for the 
“salus publica” of the state, which “demands first consideration and lies precisely in 
that legal constitution which guarantees everyone his freedom within the law.”134 We 
can see here that it is solely within the boundaries of the judicial state of affairs that 
individual freedom is possible, preserved, and secured. 
 
This argument finds an echo later on in the Doctrine of Right. There, Kant 
expands on the nature of the state’s “well-being” by saying that it “consists in the 
[three authorities] being united”, and gives us a clue that those who seek something 
different from this conception of salus publica, can attain it “more easily and 
satisfactorily in a state of nature (as Rousseau maintained) or even under a despotic 
government”135, but never by seeking them through violent means.  
 
Although our constitutions may present deep defects and errors, “it is 
absolutely unpermitted and culpable to oppose it”,136 and the call for preservation 
over radical change is not only a suggestion on Kant’s part, but a well-developed 
conception concerning the dynamics of war and peace. Once again, Kant is at one 
with Pufenforf when saying that:  
 
[A] cautious man who loves his own security will believe all men his friends but 
liable at any time to become enemies; he will keep peace with all, knowing that it may soon 





2. 3. 3 The argument from security: 
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The problem of revolution emerges with particular clarity in connection to that 
of “civil security”.138 This notion is mentioned by Kant, at least to my knowledge, in 
his Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,
139
 and I think it captures in a 
succinct manner the connection he draws in his political doctrine between the civil 
condition and juridical/political security. Here I understand the civil condition as the 
totality of the social fabric of interests and relations in their external character. This 
web of relations is made possible only through the juridical and political security 
guaranteed by the legitimate monopoly of state coercion. 
 
For this reason, I read Kant to be largely in affinity with those who, like 
Hobbes and Pufendorf, attribute to the state an important role to play in the security of 
its subjects, as a means to make possible the continuity of juridical, social and 
political relations, and the preservation of the bonds that hold them together, which 
were absent in the state of nature. 
 
As already noted, the content of Kant’s state of nature argument is not devoid 
of empirical and anthropological assumptions: it is a state marked by the antagonism 
of human interests, nurtured by their selfishness, and a latent state of war. Contrary to 
this, Kersting has argued that in Kant’s political philosophy, “the state is not 
demanded by prudence and utility, but is called for by reason itself and thus equipped 
with the property of juridical necessity”.140 I agree that Kant’s conception of the state 
responds also to his transcendental model of argumentation, but Kant still vindicates 
the “sheer necessity” that justifies our entering the civil condition, which he calls “the 
most stringent of all forms of necessity, for it is imposed by men upon themselves, in 
that their inclinations make it impossible for them to live side by side for long in a 
state of wild freedom”.141 
 
 Largely owing to these internal tensions in Kant’s thought, I contend that 
looking into the issue of revolution helps to clarify Kant’s more general position. 
From this perspective, revolutions run directly counter the “civil security” we aimed 
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at achieving in entering the civil condition, be this motivated by empirical or rational 
reasons. Thus, the juridical and political security is represented by the extant 
authorities, and lost in the face of radical political change. 
 
Whereas for Pufendorf the general rule for sovereigns is “the safety of the 
people”, for authority has been given to them “to achieve the end for which states 
were instituted”,142 for Hobbes security becomes “the End for which men subject 
themselves to others, and if it is not forthcoming, the implication is that no one has 
subjected himself to others”.143 In a similar vein Kant clearly states that the “end for 
which a civil constitution was established” is that of “securing the rightful state”. 
Finally, this end must not be achieved by violent means, for it is the aim of the state 
“to ensure its continued existence as a commonwealth”.144 
 
2. 3. 4 The argument from the alienation of sovereignty and its corollaries: 
 
 From the myriad of issues of which revolution is part, the problem of 
sovereignty brings to light like none other most of the fundamental difficulties 
involved.  I understand the problem of sovereignty to include Kant’s discussions of 
the social contract, the idea of the general will, state authority, and political 
obedience. More specifically, I refer to it as the alienation of sovereignty by claiming 
that, in Kant, the locus of political power, namely, the interpretation and enforcement 
of the general will is alienated in the figure of the sovereign, whose authority is 
defined as “irreproachable” and “irresistible”.145  
 
Kant’s particular views on these corollaries went through a progressive 
transformation, arriving in the Doctrine of Right to a more definite view in favor of a 
separation between the sovereign and the people, by finally asserting that “everyone 
among the people is purely passive in relation to the supreme power”,146 and it is the 
people’s duty to endure even the most intolerable abuse of supreme authority”.147 It is 
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thus essential to make sense of these conclusions, if we are to take them as an 
argument against revolution. 
 
No doubt these striking passages have been received by some commentators 
as “unworthy of [Kant’s] own better thinking”. 148  In a discussion over state 
sovereignty and the possibility of a federation of nations, Patrick Riley admits that 
one finds in Kant too much of a concession “to the mere de facto sovereignty of the 
states”, for someone who is arguably criticizing Hobbes. For my present 
interpretation, these discoveries are gladly welcomed.  However, we are at one with 
Riley when he also admits that “it is precisely the fear of anarchy, the loss of a 
political-legal context for morality”, that forced Kant to say some of the “harsher 




In a section of Theory and Practice titled ‘Anti-Hobbes’, Kant addresses 
Hobbes by saying that the English philosopher endorses the “quite terrifying” 
proposition according to which the head of the state “has no contractual obligations 
towards the people”, inferring from this that he can “do no injustice to a citizen” and 
act as he pleases.
150
 Given the Hobbesian heritage I have been reading into Kant’s 
thought, this must come as a rather surprising statement. 
However, writing “against Hobbes does not make Kant a disciple of 
Rousseau”.151 Interestingly, Kant’s own definition of the contractual status of the 
sovereign (the legislator) reads: “The sovereign in the state has many rights with 
respect to the subject, but no (coercive) duties”. If  the sovereign “proceeds contrary 
to the law” the subject may raise a complaint, for example by bringing a letter to the 
sovereign, “but may not actively resist”.152 
 
We see then that for Kant, the fact that the state could act unjustly can be 
posed, but the illegitimacy of rebellion still holds. It is clear that he is here arguing in 
the fashion of Pufendorf who, like Hobbes, acknowledges that the question of 
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injustice might be posed. To that end Pufendorf says: “The sovereign and the subjects 
are equally bound by natural laws, which make them sufficiently susceptible of 
injustice of one against the other.”153 
 
By further clarifying this structure, Kant explicitly reserves to the sole figure 
of the ruler the capacity to punish in his function as executive authority. This makes 
him free from being punished himself, because “to punish the ruler would mean that 
the highest executive authority itself would be subject to coercion, which is a self-
contradiction”. Thus the immunity of the ruler allows us to conclude that he is in a 
different contractual status with respect to the citizens, upon which he has the 
monopoly of coercion “in accordance with the law”, or in Kant’s particular 
interpretation of a common English saying: “The King, that is, the supreme executive 
authority, can do no wrong”.154 
 
To further the close conformity between Hobbes and Kant on this issue, we 
should turn directly to Hobbes. As it is well known, he shares with Kant the absolute 
repudiation of revolution or any form of seditious activity that challenges the power 
of the state. However, he acknowledges that there is a limiting condition to the 
sovereign’s acts, since, if he were to act unjustly, he could not do so “without 
violating natural laws and wronging God”. Hence, for Hobbes: “A Prince’s oath 
offers a certain security to his subjects”, contrary to Kant’s initial accusation.155 
 
In addition, Hobbes is willing to concede that if this appeal to natural and 
divine law, as a limiting condition for the sovereign’s acts, seems insufficient it is still 
not to the advantage of the sovereign to “want to spoil his citizens”. That the need to 
oppress them might arise stems not so much from the malevolent capriciousness of 
the government, but from the inevitable inconveniences of human affairs:  
 
For if men could rule themselves by individual self-government, that is, if they could 
live according to the natural laws, there would be absolutely no need of a commonwealth not 
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Going back to Kant, we can glean at a number of important conclusions: first, 
although sovereignty resides in the “united will of the people” which Kant declares 
“can do absolutely no injustice to anyone”157, the legitimate capacity to coerce and to 
enact this will is reserved to the ruler, thus alienating sovereignty in his person, whose 
executive authority is made effective and public through positive law. Second, that 
the ruler is immune from and exempt from punishment, and in a way unquestionable, 
precludes any possibility of legitimate revolution against its authority; more 
importantly on this point, Kant’s departure from the idea of popular sovereignty in 
favor of a pactum subiectionis
158
, in the fashion of Hobbes, eradicates the possibility 
that revolutions could be carried out in the name of the people, justifying “their 
rebellion by complaints about their unmerited suffering”, or contesting the original 
contract when by their own discretion the contract “has been severely violated”.159  
 
To emphasize, the idea that sovereignty dwells not in the people as a 
collective person capable of passing judgments against the state, but in the coercive 
authority embodied by the ruler, and enacted by the arm of positive law is, in my 
opinion, at the basis of Kant’s critique of revolution. It is in this sense that I 
understand Kant’s claim that all forms of resistance and all revolutions have stepped 
upon the principle according to which: “[T]he people, under an existing civil 
constitution, has no longer any right to judge how the constitution should be 
administered”, and thus the power of the state “to put the law into effect” is 
“irresistible”.160  
 
It is plain from these passages that Kant’s more exalted defense of man’s 
inalienable rights as a residual source of power against the sovereign, loses much of 
its actual effect in the broader scheme of things. As Waldron concludes: 
 
The virtue of positive law is its univocality, its power, its being put forwards in the 
name of the whole community, not in its reflecting necessarily, in its content, the interests and 
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One remains rather perplexed that, in the same context where Kant’s ‘Anti-
Hobbes’ argument is developed, one finds, on the one hand, Kant’s appraisal of 
freedom of the pen animated by a spirit of freedom as the “only safeguard of the 
rights of the people”162, and on the other hand, his most severe bans on the right of 
people to offer “verbal or active resistance” to the sovereign, that is, “to oppose him 
in word or deed”.163 
 
It is not my aim here to dwell on the obvious tensions that exist between these 
lines of arguments. However, I find it difficult to sustain Kant’s accusations against 
Hobbes as fair ones, given the structural similarities of their arguments as well as the 
content of their conclusions. 
 
The separation of the sovereign and the people: 
 
Kant vacillates in the ways he characterizes the figure of the sovereign;
164
 
however, I think that there is a conceptual separation between the people and the role 
of the sovereign, which yields important consequences for his argument against 
revolution. 
 
Perhaps the clearest argument for this point has been elicited by Alexis 
Philonenko.
165
 According to his reading, one must trace Kant’s rejection of a right of 
rebellion back to his principles of right, specifically to the principle of equality. It is in 
this principle where we get the conceptual definition of man as “subject”, who is 
equal in respect to the law but absolutely passive, i.e. incapable of rebellion, in 
respect to the authority. This is due to the separation at the heart of the principle, 
which reads:  
 
Every member of the commonwealth has rights of coercion against all the others, 
except in relation to the head of the state. For he alone is not a member of the commonwealth 
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its creator or preserver, and he alone is authorized to coerce others without being subject to 




This passage, Philonenko insists, unravels one of Kant’s most important claims, in 
order to pave the way for his argument against resistance, namely that the “status of 
the Sovereign constitutes an exception to the principle of equality”, so an alleged right 
of rebellion runs radically against “the conception of sovereignty itself”,167 the sole 
notion that could but a stop to the chain of submission by being conceptually exempt 
from it.  
 
In connection to the previous section, one of Kant’s reasons for consternation 
about Hobbes’s position was based on the possibility that the sovereign could have no 
obligations to its citizens. It is interesting, thus, to see that Kant himself exempts the 
sovereign as a member of the commonwealth, and insists that we can solely rely in his 
“good will”, on the hope that he governs on the basis of this attitude. It could be 
argued that the sovereign becomes bound by his own conscience and good willed 
disposition to govern in a manner akin to right. This thought is also conveyed by 
Hobbes when he writes that: 
The will of the assembly or the man to whom sovereign power has been committed is the 
will of the commonwealth; hence it comprehends the wills of individual citizens; and therefore one 
to whom sovereign power has been committed is not bound by the civil laws (which is an 
obligation to himself) nor obligated to any of the citizens”168 
 
We are able to conclude that at the heart of Kant’s account of sovereignty, 
there lies a separation between the sovereign and the people, and to draw three 
fundamental lessons: first, this separation manifests Kant’s commitment to the 
priority of order and stability over questions of popular and collective exercises of 
sovereign power; second, Kant thinks that this separation demands the attribution of 
discretion to the sovereign’s judgment, on matters of interpretation and enforcement 
of the idea of the social contract, such that the people cannot rebel by appealing to 
their own discretionary capacities. And finally, I think that we find here the germs of 
Kant’s attempt to demystify Rousseau’s idea of the theoretical, as well as practical, 
unity of the general will as a revolutionary agent. 
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In addition to these lessons, Philonenko argues that this separation goes on to 
capture two of Kant’s philosophical differences with Rousseau: on the one hand, for 
Rousseau the idea of equality is essentially “active”, as the means to establish “the 
identity of the people with the sovereign”;169 whereas for Kant, the idea of equality 
means nothing but “the equal passivity of all against power”, resulting in the 
submission of obedience. On the other hand, the idea of the sovereign’s independence 
from the people wholly transforms Rousseau’s view of the social contract, which 
“refuses to detach sovereignty from the people, notionally attached in the actuality of 
the general will”.170 
 
These are in part the reasons why I share with this interpreter that, in general, 
Kant stands in the tradition of Hobbes and Pufendorf.
171
 As it appears in their 
respective philosophies, Kant’s sovereign remains external to the commonwealth, in 
the hope that he renders tribute to the criterion of the social contract, which is made 
legitimate not by consensus. In a characteristic turn of phrase, Philonenko concludes: 
“Kant, disciple of Rousseau! Must this be but a fable?”172 
 
The bonds of the Kantian social contract: 
 To be sure, Kant departs from a conception of the social contract
173
 as 
consensual, by reiterating two basic claims of his theory of sovereignty: on the one 
hand, since entering the civil condition is not a matter of consent, we are entitled “to 
use violent means to compel another to enter into a juridical state of society”, and he 
who deliberately tries to resist this acts “in the highest degree wrongly [and 
unjustly]”;174 on the other hand, the nature of the social contract as an idea of reason 
eliminates the consent of the majority as the mark for its legitimacy.
175
 As Filkschuh 
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points out, in Kant “the civil condition is not established through an act of consensual 
self-constitution by its members but results from morally necessary subordination by 
members under a head”.176 
 
 This is possibly the right place to raise a question regarding the nature of 
Kant’s contract as the ground for the juridical condition: if a consensual act is not 
what justifies the corresponding subordination to public authority, what then holds the 
civil condition once it is established? The individual’s awareness of a moral duty to 
enter the state? A sense of justice? A Hobbesian fear of violent death?  
 
 The question is highly relevant and I think it involves two different points: 
first, a question regarding the reasons that motivate us to enter the civil condition in 
the first place; and second, a question concerning the role of the state, such that it is 
worthy to hold on to and, more importantly for my interpretation, to preserve and 
protect the juridical condition. 
 I will concentrate on the latter point, namely, on the role of the state in Kant 
and the bond that holds its existence together. The question is relevant since a radical 
political change as the one intended in a revolution, involves essentially a questioning 
concerning the binding force of the civil condition and, more generally, a challenge to 
the whole concept of statehood.  
 
 In the case of Hobbes, for example, the answer to these questions seems clear 
from the outset: fear is both the element that compels us to enter the civil condition 
and also the reason to remain in it.
177
 Even if all the subjects of the commonwealth 
directed their wills to a “common good” to channel their ends and cancel out their 
antagonisms, fear would still be needed.
178
  The role of the Hobbesian state is thus the 
translation of a common fear into a state of security: “Security is the End for which 
men subject themselves to others, and if it is not forthcoming, the implication is that 
no one has subjected himself to others”.179 
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 Contrary to this Hobbesian picture, fear is not the vehicle through which the 
Kantian state holds its parts together. However, Kant sees an intimate connection 
between creating the conditions for “civil security” in the spirit of freedom, and 
holding the existence of this condition by means of a coercive authority. Thus, to 
preserve the existence of the civil condition, Kant acknowledges, “an additional 
unifying cause” must be present in addition to the will of all to live in accordance 
with the principles of freedom: establishing coercive authority “by force”, upon which 
“public right will subsequently be based”.180  
 
 The final element of this reconstruction is that legitimate use of coercion, or in 
Filkschuh’s wording, the “coercive political authority”, 181  needs to fit in legal-
synergy, so to speak, with the idea of the co-existing freedom of all. This is, in 
essence, a version of what I argued extensively in Chapter 1 as Kant’s definition of 
the problem of politics, in terms of the reconciliation between order and freedom.  
 To sum up: it is a distinctively Kantian answer to the question of the role of 
the state that the exercise of coercive authority is not to be done without a necessary 
qualification. The problem of inaugurating and maintaining a civil condition demands 
the reconciliation of two elements: order and freedom, but not any order; order 
understood as the sphere “where the concepts of reason only allow for lawful 
coercion, in keeping with the principles of freedom, which alone makes possible a 
rightful established political constitution”.182 
 
 I emphasize the word “lawful” since, for Kant, an empirical shortcoming in 
the current exercise of coercion will never count as a reason for a legitimate claim of 
rebellion. The legitimacy of the monopoly of coercion on the part of the de facto state 
is repeatedly confirmed by Kant, when he says that: “The authority that is now here 
and under which you live is already in possession of the [right of] legislation”, and 
you “cannot set yourself up as opposing legislators”.183 
 
Moreover, it has been noted that Kant’s departure from the “revolutionary 
implications” of Rousseau’s idea of the social contract, places him closer to Hobbes, 
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for whom, “any public authority is preferable to the state of nature”. On this point, 
Baynes detects that the alliance with Hobbes is not absolute, since the social contract 
involves a “critical function” in Kant that is absent in Hobbes.  
 
Surely, the critical function that the idea of the social contract adopts in the 
context of Kant’s argument is important. However, it calls too quickly for a 
qualification Baynes’s himself has identified, namely, that the critical use of the idea 
of the social contract to test the justness of public law and its application is limited to 
the sovereign’s will, as it is with Hobbes.  
 
It is with this argument in view that Kant is able to say in Theory and Practice 
that the sovereign, as far as he is the representation of the general Will, “from which 
all right proceeds and which must not therefore itself be able to do injustice to 
anyone. And this requires no less than the will of the entire people…For only towards 
oneself can one never act unjustly”.184 Kant places this thought as a direct counter-
argument against revolutionary claims which, on the basis of the alleged injustice on 
the part of the sovereign, find it necessary to rebel. That the sovereign must thus be 
understood as an uncontestable mirror of the will of all, points back to the Leviathan, 
where Hobbes says: 
 
He that complaineth of injury from his sovereign complaineth of that whereof he 
himself is the author, and thereof ought not to accuse any man but himself; no himself of 
injury, because to do injury to one’s self, is impossible.185 
 
I think that all of this adds further evidence to Kant’s departure from 
Rousseau’s conceptions of the social contract and the general Will. The 
“revolutionary implications” that Bayne rightly sees in Rousseau are understood by 
Kant not as the idea that the sovereign could be mistaken, or willing to act contrary to 
the people’s will, but that he can be contested, and consequently opposed.  
 
 That history has given too many examples of this being exactly the case, the 
actual abuse on the part of the government is for Kant unfortunate, and may indeed 
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“need to be gradually improved in many respects” through constitutional reforms,186 
yet it can never serve as a justification for triggering the “revolutionary thrill”.187  
 
In my view, Kant’s critique of revolution cannot be adequately understood 
without keeping in mind the context from which he derives his, sometimes, 
unwelcomed conclusions. For some, Kant’s ultimate appeal to unrestricted authority, 
his advancement of positive law, and the admission of uses of coercion without 
qualification, is too close to a capitulation to Hobbesian prudentialism
188
, an 




Revolution as a second-order question: 
 
 A sequel to the problem of sovereignty and revolution can be articulated as an 
essential gap that remains between who is to legitimately hold coercive power, on the 
one hand, and on the other hand who is to judge that such legitimacy holds, or in the 
case of a negative judgment, whether the holder of power should be overthrown or 
changed.  
 
 This problem has been recognized by Christopher Meckstroth
190
 by explaining 
that, for Kant, revolution takes the form of a “second-order question”, namely, a 
question about “who is to say whether or not a putative authority performs its required 
role sufficiently well to merit obedience in practice”. Also, he anticipated that while 
Kant deserves credit for focusing attention on this question, “he cannot also be said to 
have solved it”.191  
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We should pause here for a moment, as it seems to me that this conclusion 
could be avoided in the following ways: firstly, I think that phrasing the problem of 
revolution, as it appears in Kant, in the way Meckstroth construes it is ill-formed, 
since it basically incorporates into the question a view of legitimacy as dependent on 
the people’s judgment on the putative authorities exercise of power, and as a 
condition for their willingness to obey. This is something we do not find in Kant. 
Secondly, thinking that Kant has left us without a solution to the problem of 
legitimacy, seems to be based on a democratic expectation on our part with respect to 
Kant’s views. As Filkschuh has rightly argued, we could be tempted to draw a reading 
of Kant as a “quintessentially democratic thinker”, who addresses this second-order 
issue by locating “sovereignty in ‘the people’”, and taking the general will as an 
“empirical reality”.192  Yet, it is plain for Kant that the idea of the united will of all 
has no empirical reality but serves as a criterion at the hands of the sovereign to judge 
the social contract. 
  
However, in my view, the value of arguments like Meckstroth’s lies in 
bringing to light Kant’s particular way of dealing with the problem of revolution, 
regardless of our expectations. I think that Kant identifies two basic mistakes in this 
picture: first, that, there is no empirical embodiment of the idea of ‘the people’, such 
that it can act as a collective agent; and second, that the sovereign does not derive his 
authority from consensus, but from the demand reason places in every individual to 
abandon the state of nature and enter the civil condition. 
 
Non-states, barbarism, and non-Kantian justifications for revolution: 
A substantial group of interpreters
193
 have taken a similar line of argument, 
presenting their concerns as follows: if entering a juridical condition is a demand of 
reason, how are we to know we are actually in one and not, for example, in a mock-
state
194
 of right? Have we ever, following Kant’s closely, left the state of nature? 
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 According to this line of thought, a juridical state must be sufficiently 
distinguishable from a state of nature since only in the former condition revolutions 
are unjust. This has been defended by Byrd and Hruschka who think that Kant’s 
prohibition against revolution “only applies in a state that is truly a juridical state”.195 
Before we move forward, notice the inherent valuation in the qualification of a “truly” 
juridical state. If we look back into Kant’s own technical definition of a juridical state, 
there are only two options available: either we are in a state of nature “in which 
justice is absent (status iustitiae vacuus)”,196 or we are in a juridical state, “under 
which alone everyone is able to enjoy his right”.197 No further qualifications are given 
to the juridical state, nor a scale of gradation between true and less-true forms of such 
a condition. 
The novelty of this argument was, interestingly, already anticipated in 
Schlegel, who said to have recognized in Perpetual Peace that an abusive and 
corrupted government cannot be rightly judged as performing its duty, so that it 
becomes “a quasi-state, not a genuine form but as a degenerated form of the state.”198 
Thus, for a radical like Schlegel, revolutions could be justified by involving two 
different calls: a moral call to resist despots, and a political call to overturn unjust 
governments, in order to inaugurate better and more secure constitutions.  
But, one wonders, how about borderline cases? Byrd and Hruschka seem to 
recognize this difficulty when, in describing the duty to reform the constitution, “as 
finite and fallible beings we can only approach the state in the idea, and thus will 
never actually realize the perfect constitution.” I think this acknowledgment is much 
more in line with the spirit of Kant’s views on revolution and statehood, in admitting 
                                                                                                                                                              
without freedom” which is despotism, third, “force without freedom and law”, which is barbarism, and 
finally, “force with freedom and law”, which is a republic.  From these combinations, Ripstein 
concludes that Kant’s remarks about revolution must be read as directed against barbaric states, a 
degenerative form of a republic. Properly understood, when a state becomes barbaric it turns into a 
“defective form of a state of nature”, dominated by the unilateral use of brute and arbitrary force. 
Those who find themselves confronted with this state may rightly revolt against it, and seek to establish 
a rightful condition in its place. Under this defective form of state, “no issue arises of whether it may 
be resisted with right”: it must be resisted. Although the appeal to barbarism is powerful in its own 
grounds, I find it rather surprising that Kant does not argue for this typology, nor expands on the nature 
of barbarism in his political writings. The dichotomy we get throughout the texts is reduced to either 
despotism or republicanism as forms of government. Interestingly, revolution is banned in both 
scenarios. Cf. Ripstein, A. (2012) ‘Kant and the Circumstances of Justice’ in Kant’s Political Theory 
Ed. Elisabeth Ellis, The Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania, pp. 67-68 
195
 Byrd, S. & Hruschka, J. (2010) p. 91 
196
 Doctrine of Right § 43, 312 
197
 Doctrine of Right § 41, 306 
198
 Schlegel in Malik (2012) p. 670 
 51 
that we will inevitably find ourselves enduring “a juridical state with some degree of 
excess in state power”, that is, “a government not totally aligned with the idea of the 
original contract”.199 
 
I suspect that it is one of the virtues of Byrd’s and Hurshka’s interpretation, 
that it encourages Kant’s readers to look for the necessary conditions that must be 
fulfilled in the ideal juridical state, i.e., separation of powers, governance in 
accordance with the laws of freedom and the general will, etc. However, my worry 
has to do with the distortions this line of argument brings to the issue of revolution in 
Kant’s thought, and here I have two things in mind: on the one hand, Kant’s rejection 
of revolution is well-grounded, to the extent that we are already in the context of a 
juridical condition or rechtlicher Zustand
200
; on the other hand, such arguments, if 
taken out of context, could jeopardize Kant’s insistence that a state of nature must be 
abandoned, and that the juridical condition must be preserved and protected.  
Moreover, what these arguments fail to notice is that, for Kant, we do not have 
to be in the extreme case of despotism, or even in a mediocre state with systematic 
shortcomings in the exercise of right, in order to realize the essential fragility of our 
institutions and the precariousness of instantiating “civil security” as a guarantee to 
maintain, protect, and promote external freedom. It is precisely because of this 
fragility that revolutions are not only a crime, but represent a step backwards in our 
(moral) duty to achieve better constitutions.  
It is important to mention here a connection I think Kant makes between 
constitutional stability and the elimination of violent conflict. As history has 
sufficiently shown, revolutions are prone to bring civil unrest, resulting in civil war. It 
is the case with Kant, as it is with Hobbes, that war is thought of as a “political 
evil”, 201  that unleashes unforeseen consequences and which must be avoided. 
Contrary to Kant’s well-known proviso, revolution seems to be justified on the basis 
of a valuation of mock-states.  
Remedial views of justice: 
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That Kant does not hold a remedial view of justice of the kind espoused by 
Hobbes and Locke is, according to Ripstein, clear from his position on the right of 
revolution, and his commitment to “the supremacy of the rule of law against other 
normative claims that seek to contest it”. The argument thus concludes that, since 
justice and law are in no way remedial of the deficiencies either of our nature or of 




 I think that Ripstein is right in emphasizing Kant’s commitment to the 
“supremacy of the rule of law” if by this we understand the principle of right as it is 
translated and enacted by positive law. Moreover, if by a “remedial view of justice” 
we understand a paternal and interventionist state that goes beyond its role as arbiter 
in conflicting claims of right, I also agree with Ripstein’s suggestion. 
 
 However, Kant is also deeply committed to a view of politics where the 
reconciliation of order and freedom is seen as a difficult, yet not impossible task, and 
revolutions are the most clear of example of a threat to this reconciliation. If this is 
right, it could be argued that Kant does have a remedial view of justice to the extent 
that its embodiment in the civil condition is needed, in order to eradicate our 
antagonistic interests, compel us to obey the law, create an external, unifying bond 
independent of our moral attitudes, and to guarantee the continuity and security of 




Against popular sovereignty and violence: the locus of the disappointment. 
 Those who grasp in Kant’s critique of revolution a deep-seated mistrust of the 
masses and also a restricted view of popular sovereignty, could be willing to also 
acknowledge, as I suggest we should, the sharpness of his thought in realizing the 
connection between revolutions and permanent violent conflict.  
 
That the events of the French Revolution incorporated in the horizon of Kant’s 
political philosophy the problem of armed conflict, civil war, and violence, is further 
confirmed in the Contest of the Faculties, where he insists that the “true enthusiasm” 
in that the human race will improve morally, is always directed “exclusively towards 
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the ideal”, since in reality we have available only a “negative guarantee” for progress: 
the duty to “submit to those conditions by which war, the source of all evils and 
moral corruption, can be prevented”.204   
 
It is all the more astounding that precisely in this text, which has served as the 
traditional source for a defense of Kant’s approval of the French Revolution, is also 
found the locus of his discussion on the negative effects of war as an “obstacle to 
morality”, an “enemy of progress”, and the impediment for a constitution’s 
stability.
205
 Although the French Revolution aroused a sentiment of sympathy in its 
spectators, when it comes to state reform Kant is still in favor of “pursuing evolution 
instead of revolution”.206  
  
I think that both of these claims foster, to a significant extent, one of the 
sources of dissatisfaction with Kant’s reaction against revolution, namely his taking 
part for the continuity of order and legality over radical political change through 
collective action. This crucial commitment of Kant’s political thought has been 
recognized by Malik when he says that, contrary to the hopes of Rousseau and the 
radical Kantians, “the mere wishes of a majority” remained for Kant “just a blind 
statement of desire unlimited by law, it is the attitude of the mob”.207  Thus, by 
discrediting popular action as a vehicle for juridical and political progress, Kant 
proposes a model of top-down reform, leaving the hopes of his radical followers 
unfulfilled. 
 
Kant’s limited diagnosis of revolutions: an appeal to Edmund Burke 
I think we are now in a position to acknowledge that Kant’s diagnosis of the 
nature and the outcomes of modern revolutions is somewhat limited in scope. This is 
the case if we compare it, for example, to the complexity of Edmund Burke’s insights 
into the political, sociological, religious, and historical factors that played a decisive 
role in the revolutionary experiments in the XVIIIth century in Europe, most 
particularly in the French Revolution.  
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The depth of Burke’s careful account of revolution is evident in passages like 
the following, which is worth quoting in full: 
 
Great discontent frequently arises in the best constituted governments from causes 
which no human wisdom can foresee, and no human power can prevent…Governments of all 
kinds are administered only by men; and great mistakes, tending to inflame these discontents 
may concur.... In such circumstances the minds of the people become sore and ulcerated. . . 
From their disgust at [public] men, they are soon led to quarrel with their frame of 
government…Then will be felt the full effect of encouraging doctrines which tend to make the 




However, I think that some of these thoughts resonate in Kant’s own 
arguments, at least in spirit. One can conjecture that, due to Kant’s naïve confidence 
that the strong but wise sovereign he had in mind would promote top-down reforms of 
the state, together with the authoritarian bent of his political philosophy, his views on 
revolution remained rather restricted. Kant does not seem to have a fully developed a 
diagnosis of the reasons that trigger revolutionary actions in the manner of Burke. 
However, it is equally right to say that Kant looked for the origins of revolution not so 
much in the internal fractures of society, or in the social discontent that could emanate 
from the people that conformed it, but rather on a reformist, and essentially 
conservative view of statehood and constitutional stability, that favored slow 
processes of reform over radical change, and held a deep commitment to the internal 
challenge of any juridical condition to maintain and secure itself in the context of 
peace.  A similar thought is expressed in Burke by saying: “ 
 
History consists, for the greater part, of the miseries brought upon the world by pride, 
ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train of 
disorderly appetites, which shake the public with the same ‘-troublous storms that toss/The 
private state, and render life unsweet’. These vices are the causes of those storms. Religions, 




However, it remains a virtue of Kant’s political thought the consistent 
identification of revolution as a political problem, and not as a phenomenon only 
relevant for his philosophy of history, or his moral philosophy more generally. In this, 
he stands side by side with Burke, whose theory of revolution, as Michael Freeman 
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has rightly argued, was based on a “Hobbesian view of unrestrained man and the 
social need for power and order”.210 
 
2.3.5  The argument from judgment: 
 
One of the cornerstones of Kant’s critique of revolution is the claim that, in 
entering the civil condition, the subject “has no longer any right to judge how the 
constitution should be administered”, and solely the constituted “lawful supreme 
authority” has the right to determine “what is or is not to be publicly just”; this 




 Taken together, these ideas foster the basis of Kant’s fundamental veer 
towards a conception of sovereignty according to which the sovereign and the people 
are conceptually separated. As we saw in previous sections, this separation rested on a 
particular notion of the social contract as a criterion for justice at the service of the 
sovereign, and not as a vehicle for the people to pass judgment against the 
interpretation and enforcement of authority. If my interpretation of this general 
structure is correct, I will now argue that this conception of sovereignty implied for 
Kant three further claims: first, matters of conflicting claims of judgments about 
justice are, essentially, non-disputable; second, the authority of the sovereign is non-
contestable; and third, the juridical condition is marked by a sharp separation between 
private and public judgment.  
 
In spite of its relevance, the gist of this argument is not completely developed 
in Kant. It is based, at least in part, on a more general assumption about the external 
character of Law, and on an appeal to positive law to settle matters of conflicts of 
justice. Yet, I think there is sufficient material to show Kant’s deep commitment to 
the reservation of judgment to the role of the sovereign, a position that is remarkably 
resonant with that of Hobbes. 
 
 One way to tackle these thoughts is by means of a comparison. According to 
Kant, the state of nature is primarily characterized by a situation where, in the absence 
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of lawful coercion, “everyone follows his own judgment”212 , and the individuals 
pursue their ends by following “the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct 
everything in accordance with his own ideas”. 213  In the juridical state, however, 
matters of justice are settled by the sanction of Public Law, that is, until a “competent 
judge can be found to render a decision having the force of law”.214 This force, as it 
has already been explained, is the force enacted by the legitimate use of coercion.  
 
 It is plain that one of the obvious reasons for inaugurating a state is the 
necessity for an external authority to embody the force of law. However, the point is 
crucial for Kant in its connection to the issue of revolution. I contend that, for Kant, 
the essential mistake underlying revolutions is that they spring from the premise that 
the people retain a right to pass judgment to the extant authorities, and the result of 
that verdict serves as a justification for taking arms against the state. 
 
Kant expresses this worry in the context of a discussion of the social contract. 
There he identifies that the “revolutionary fallacy” results from thinking the social 
contract as a fact and not as a rational criterion to judge current constitutions. This 
assumption, Kant goes on to argue, is based on a deeply-held belief that the people 
“retain the right to abrogate the original contract at its own discretion, if, in the 
opinion of the people, the contract has been severely violated”.215 That he has in mind 
a view held specifically by revolutionaries is immediately confirmed by an explicit –
and much pertinent- reference to Danton, who, professing this mistaken view, 
declares that “all property and all rights under the existing civil constitution are null 
and void”.216   
 
There are two leading ideas in Kant’s diagnosis of the “revolutionary fallacy”: 
on the one hand, the alienation of the idea of the social contract in the body of the 
ruler precludes the possibility of popular contestability to his judgment; and on the 
other hand, Kant corroborates here the claim that a revolution would imply a state of 
anarchy
217
, where all relations based on right would be void, a situation, as Waldron 
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describes it, where “we must expect that individuals will disagree about right and 
justice and that this disagreement will lead to violent conflict”.218 
 
Moreover, the mitigation of conflicting right claims and senses of justice is 
thus, for Kant, in the hands of the sovereign, and all revolutions not only make 
conflicting disagreement irresolvable by bringing about a state of anarchy, but do 
even more harm by making this conflict permanent, silencing the voice that ultimately 
settles claims on what is right and what is wrong: the voice of positive law. In a 
slightly formal version of this thought, Kant states: 
 
For since the people must already be considered as united under a general legislative 
will before they can pass judgment upon the highest power within the state (summum 
imperium), they cannot and may not pass any judgement other than that which is willed by the 
current head of the state (summus imperans)”.219 
 
 
Similarly, it is worth examining the marked parallelism this line of thought 
plays in Hobbes. For Hobbes, conflicting judgments and opinions are an inimical 
source of unrest, and a detrimental source of the commonwealth’s dissolution. 
Disputes among men arise when opinions differ “about mine and yours, just and 
unjust”, a condition where “everyone decides them by their own judgment”. 220 
Rebellion against the sovereign rests for Hobbes in an “original error”, according to 
which everyone mistakenly claims “the knowledge of what is just and unjust which 
belongs to the commonwealth”, thus doing “what one man can do to undermine 
human society and the civil life of this world”.221 
 
Much later, in Leviathan, Hobbes reminds us that in entering the social 
contract, one of the things we transfer to the sovereign –be this a man or one 
assembly- is our judgment on all affairs concerning “the common peace and safety of 
the commonwealth”, and so to submit their wills: “…every one to his will, and their 
judgments, to his judgment”,222 authorizing him to be author of all my actions. 
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This Hobbesian argument has been named by Jean Hampton as the ‘surrender 
of judgment’ model of authority,223 by means of which Hobbes makes possible the 
justification of absolute sovereignty and the consequent elimination of individual 
judgments. It has been noted in the literature that attributing this model to Hobbes 
seems to conflict with his claim that the subjects retain the right to resist the 
sovereign, on the basis of their right to self-defense. According to Hampton, this 
places a serious problem at the heart of Hobbes’s theory, implying the idea that: 
 
[T]he sovereign is not the only authority in the commonwealth and that he will have 
to reckon with disobedience or rebellion on the part of some or all of his subjects if they 
decide that his laws or actions jeopardize their lives.
224
   
 
It could be argued that a similar worry seems to be present in Kant’s own 
arguments: on the basis of the subject’s retaining “inalienable rights”, rights which 
“he cannot give up even if he wishes to”, it might be inferred that the subject could 
make a judgment against the extant authority if those same rights are endangered by 
the sovereign’s actions. 225  However, Kant gives little to no explanation on what 
exactly these “inalienable rights” amount to, nor to the effects of such reservation. 
The closer we get to an explanation of this claim is found in the Contest of the 
Faculties, where Kant explicitly refers to the rights of men as a “sacred institution” 
which, however, “remains only an idea” that must always be fulfilled with means 
compatible with morality. Naturally, pursuing and securing these rights by violent and 
revolutionary means is always wrong,
226
 thus placing a categorical ban to the 
possibility that they could ever be used by the people to overstep public authority. 
  
This treatment of inalienable rights, in conjunction with Kant’s general 
considerations on private judgment, provides a parallel to the Hobbesian surrender 
model suggested by Hampton. Moreover, the Kantian subject not only surrenders all 
substantial claims on the interpretation and administration of the constitution, but 
retains a set of inalienable rights that are merely an idea. The Hobbesian subject, 
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however, still has available his appeal to self-preservation, bringing its own 
difficulties to Hobbes’s argument for absolute sovereignty.227  
 
I turn to Waldron for some final thoughts on this issue. In his provocative 
paper ‘Kant and Legal Positivism’228, Waldron rightly connects Kant’s account on the 
sovereignty and judgment as an instance of “authoritarianism”229 in his thought. This, 
Waldron argues, becomes clear with respect to the question of the application of 
principles of right and justice. Kant reserves this application to the authority of 
positive law, yet the quality of this law is not open to judgment, less so on the basis of 
the original inalienability of rights against the sovereign. The contrary view would 
imply: “turning his back on the idea of our sharing a view about right or justice and 
implementing it in the name of the community”, as if it were better “to revert to a 
situation in which each person acts on his own particular judgment about justice”.230 
 
I share with Waldron that Kant’s position on these issues brings to the fore a 
solution to the problem of politics of an essentially authoritarian form. But the 
importance of this point does not lie in indicating the alleged deficiencies of Kant’s 
solution to the problem of sovereignty and its effects on his views on revolution. As I 
have argued in previous sections, we should keep our democratic expectations distinct 
from the complexity of Kant’s own critique. What I think needs emphasizing are 
Kant’s view on justice more generally, and also the connection he draws between 
legitimacy and positive law as a banner for revolutionary justifications. As Kant 
himself concludes in the Doctrine of Right: 
 
The authority that is now here and under which you live is already in possession of 
the right legislation. Though you may indeed publicly discuss and debate this legislation, you 




2.3.6 The argument from happiness and needs: 
 
In the context of her defense of a Hobbesian right of rebellion, Susan Sreedhar 
offers a useful methodological distinction between two types of rebellion: ideological 
                                                        
227
 This problem is discussed in detail by Sreedhar (2010), chap 3. 
228
 Waldron, J. (1996) ‘Kant’s Legal Positivism’ Harvard Law Review, vo. 109, No. 7 
229
 Ibid., p. 1563 
230
 Ibid., p. 1564 
231
 Doctrine of Right, Appendix, 372, my emphasis 
 60 
rebellion and rebellion from necessity, further distinguished by their motivations.
232
 
On the one side, ideological rebellions “are motivated by moral, political, or religious 
concerns”, whereas rebellions from necessity are motivated by “self-preservation”, 
where the “lives of the rebels are insecure and they judged rebellion to be the best, or 
the only, means to self-preservation”.233 Since the problem of self-preservation is not, 
at least in his political writings,
234
 a concern for Kant, I will depart from the specific 
content of Sreedhar’s argument on this point. 
 
I think that the distinction between these two types of rebellions is 
illuminating because, in my view, “necessity” is understood by Kant in a broader 
sense than Hobbes: namely, as any motivating reason for rebellion, justified on the 
basis of a material and moral needs. Interestingly, and contrary to Sredhard’s reading 
of Hobbes, both types of rebellions are rejected in Kant’s critique of revolution.  
 
Kant phrases his argument in the form of a criticism to “the principle of 
happiness”, one which has “ill effects in political right just as in morality”, and which 
“can never serve as a valid principle of legislation”.235 This assertion is the substance 
of Kant’s more general claim according to which, revolutionary motivations rest on 
endorsement of this principle, i.e., an idea of happiness which the people “might 
expect to derive from the institutions or administration of the commonwealth”. This, 
Kant thinks, is the “usual fallacy” championed by those who defend a right of 
rebellion, in “allowing the principle of happiness to influence the judgment, wherever 
the principle of right is involved”.236 
 
On my reading, Kant’s “principle of happiness” should be understood as 
involving the political, moral and material claims of the people, translated by 
revolutionary rhetoric in terms of needs for, either better constitutions, more 
participative procedures of justice, an exhortation for spaces for the expansion of 
freedom, and/or a demand for material well-being. Both these needs, in the broad 
sense we are here proposing, coupled with ideas in favor of radical political change 
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over gradual reform are, from Kant’s perspective, rejected as a justification for 
rebellion. As Kersting has succinctly argued, we do not find in Kant a space for 
claims of right that “arise from one’s neediness, since for him “ a community of right 
is not a community of solidarity among the needy, but a community of self-protection 
among those who have the power to act”.237 
 
Furthermore, Kant’s main conclusion on this issue can be phrased as follows: 
the motivating force behind revolutions is based on an appeal to the indeterminate 
character of the principle of happiness, and in doing so, revolutions make “all lawful 
constitutions insecure” and legislators cease to follow the principle of right, giving 
way to a principle of benevolence, and so become “despotic” and “paternal”, while 
“the people are unwilling to give up their universal human desire to seek happiness in 
their own way, and thus become rebels”.238 
 
This is what Hannah Arendt referred to as the “change of direction” of 
revolutions, and more specifically of the French Revolution. Arendt states that: “It 
was necessity, the urgent needs of the people that unleashed the terror and sent the 
Revolution to its doom”, where the original principles of the revolution were 
overshadowed by “the naked forced of want and need.”239 I think that we can rightly 
argue that, to a significant extent, Kant’s critique of revolution and his discussion of 
happiness anticipates Arendt’s basic conclusions, specially het claim according to 
which Revolutions “aimed no longer at freedom, [since] the goal of the revolution had 
become the happiness of the people”.240 Kant recognized that revolutions were driven 
by the aspiration to resolve the “social question”241 through political means, leading to 
political instability and social unrest. 
 
2. 3. 7 The argument from publicity: 
 
Kant’s arguments in favor of publicity and the public use of reason seem to be 
in patent tension with his claims on political obedience and revolutions. However, in a 
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closer look, Kant qualifies his position by circumscribing criticism to the progressive 
advancement of Enlightenment thought, thus forging a “divorce” between “the public 
activity of reason and its political effects”.242 As Astorga observes, he hoped that, in 
the long run, public reasoning will have an “effects in the common good…to be 
assimilated by the sovereign and even to become the principle of all legislation”.243 
 
Thus, Kant’s insistence on the public character of right is aimed to build 
bridges between the sovereign’s authority and the subject’s sense of obedience, as 
well as to advance his agenda for a public and gradually cultivated enlightenment. 
The principle of publicity is thus presented as the ultimate seal of the original 
contract, where the individual wills of the contractual parts merge into a single will, 
with a single voice that represented the aforementioned principle as it appears in 
Theory and Practice: “Whatever a people cannot impose upon itself cannot be 
imposed upon it by the legislator either”.244 
 
Now, consider the argument from publicity in the context of Perpetual Peace. 
Here it becomes plain the connection Kant wants to draw between the “public 
quality” necessary in all claims of right, and the impossibility of a right of rebellion. 
The transcendental formula of public right reads: “All actions affecting the rights of 
other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made 
public”. It follows that a maxim to rebel against an –allegedly- unjust state would 
render the law conditionally binding, so: “The injustice of rebellion is thus apparent 
from the fact that if the maxim upon which it would act were publicly acknowledged, 
it would defeat its own purpose. This maxim would therefore have to be kept 
secret.”245 
 
At first glance, it certainly looks as though the vindication of a principle of 
publicity as a criterion to judge the original contract seems to be, in reality, basically 
ineffective. It could be objected that, on the face of a systematic violation of rights, 
the people would be justified in publicly expressing a maxim of rebellion. To this 
objection, Kant resorts to the following explanation in the form of a thought-
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experiment: Before establishing the civil state, people are asked if they can make it a 
condition for founding the new constitution whether “it dares to make public the 
maxim of its intention to rebel on certain occasions”. It follows that, if such a maxim 
were made public, “the people would have to claim rightful authority over its ruler”, 




Again, the formal structure of this argument seems to leave the objection 
untouched. However, I think that the apparent limitations of the effects of publicity in 
the actual exercise of the sovereign’s authority are due to Kant’s confidence in two 
claims: first, that the sovereign power should, and must, be responsive to the people’s 
opinions when he has deviated from the spirit of the social contract; and second, that 
through the practice of freedom of the pen, the progressive creation of a public 
opinion would improve and solidify the basis for the duty of obedience, by requiring 
each individual “to be convinced by reason that the coercion which prevails is 
lawful”, and consequently to lessen the proliferation of dissent.247  
 
 We can see from the above that both of these claims are meant to serve as an 
argument for the cohesion of obedience on the part of the citizens, and for the 
assurance of authority on the part of the sovereign’s maturity. Once these premises 
are brought to light, we are able to uncover, once again, Kant’s deep concern on the 
issue of revolution and sedition as a problem with a public and political dimension.  
 
From this perspective, I think that we should read Kant’s remarks on freedom of 
the pen and critical thinking as aiming not at boosting “political unrest”,248 in Kant’s 
own words, but on the contrary, as an appointed input for the sovereign to: rectify 
when necessary, impose laws akin to the spirit of freedom,
249
 and more importantly, 
to make him “aware that he possesses irresistible supreme power” to make public his 
maxim “that he will punish any rebellion by putting the ringleaders to death, even if 
they believed that [the sovereign] was himself the first to infringe the law”.250 
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 It contend thus, that Kant’s emphasis on the exercise of a critical public 
opinion serves a threefold role: first, to guarantee an input for the maturity and 
regeneration of state authority; second, to serve as a channel for social and political 
discontent; and thirdly, as a means to influence a sense of confidence and trust in our 
constitutional obligations, especially that of obedience to the extant authorities, 
regardless of our public judgments of felt discontent. As Filkschuh acknowledges, 
freedom of the pen comes as the “public counterweight” to the legitimate –and 
absolute- coercive authority of the sovereign, who may choose to lend his ear to the 
public or to remain intolerant to the recalcitrant subject, and still “retain legitimacy 
merely in virtue of being the sole possible representative of the idea of the general 
united will”.251 
 
 Contrary to this moderate reading of the reformist potential of Kant’s 
endorsement of publicity and freedom of speech, Jürgen Habermas’s252 interpretation 
of Kant’s discussion of publicity in the context of his critical philosophy, has been 
devoted to show that this is “the one principle that could guarantee the convergence of 
politics and morality”, thus creating a public sphere able to harmonize the 
enlightenment’s “critical use of reason” with the principle of legal order. According to 
Habermas, Kant rehabilitated a dynamic discouraged by Hobbes’s neutralization of 
civil society, “along with its conflicts of conscience, as a private sphere”, 253  by 
showing the importance of critically crafting what he calls “a collective oneness of the 
combined will of all”,254 that could bring back into the public sphere what Hobbes had 
eradicated “at the price of monopolizing public power in the hand of the monarch” for 




 I agree with Habermas in that the argument for publicity is strictly related to 
Kant’s encouragement for the progressive enlightenment of the masses, and also for 
the creation of a more robust and stable legal order. However, it is clear from Kant’s 
own conception of the problem of politics,
256
 that morality is a matter of the private 
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sphere of the individual, and the birth of a “collective oneness” as the one Habermas’s 
envisions should be created in the strict limits of the public character of right, for the 
coexistence of external freedom. 
 
 Moreover, I think that Kant learned from Hobbes that the reconciliation of 
order and freedom in the context of a juridical state could only be done by posing 
significant constraints to the effects of an active public sphere. So, Habermas’s 
accusation against Hobbes’s “neutralization of civil society” could, in my view, be 
directed to Kant as well, whom, in the manner of Hobbes, made a sharp separation 
between the private and public realms. 
 
2. 3. 8 The argument from the highest political good: 
 
Kant takes crucially into account the inclinations and interests of human 
beings. In this sense Kant may be rightly considered a political realist in the 
Machiavellian and Hobbesian tradition, which, according to Strauss, abandoned “the 
original meaning of the good society or the good life” for a realistic reflection on the 
foundations of civil society. Thus Kant is aligned with a tradition that shifts the 
question of Classical political philosophy, from “how men ought to live” for a right 
order of society to emerge, to answering the question of “how men actually live”, a 
shift where “the root or the efficient cause takes the place of the end or of the 
purpose”.257 
 
It is a telling sign of the difficulties surrounding Kant’s political philosophy 
that ideas such as the Kingdom of Ends,
258
 do not seem to sit terribly well with what I 
have just suggested. However, we are able to take these tensions as a matrix to 
distinguish between Kant’s teleological and moral considerations, on the one side, and 
Kant’s realistic considerations in matters of politics on the other side. The realm of 
the juridical condition is not the realm of ends, although from the perspective of the 
ideal and the march of moral progress, they should coincide. Moreover, I think that 
even in Kant’s more optimistic expectations of this process, going from a state of 
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“empirical politics”259 to the “sublimely metaphysical” Idea of a perfect Republic 
would not imply the moral improvement of men as individuals, but what Riley calls 
“the sublimation of conflict” in terms of hostilities and violent threats. 260  As a 
consequence of this, Kant acknowledges that the “highest political good” is thus not 
the summum bonum in the manner of the Classical tradition of political philosophy, 
but the distinctively Kantian notion of “perpetual peace”.261 He evaluates this process 
as the slow advancement of gradual reforms such that “no attempt should be made, 
however, to realize this Idea precipitously through revolutionary methods, that is, by 
the violent overthrow of a previously existing imperfect and corrupt [government].”262 
 Two features in particular deserve emphasis: firstly, the fact that Kant himself 
draws a clear distinction between the ideal state –that is, a perfect republic-, and the 
“imperfect and corrupt” empirical examples we have at present. Secondly, and more 
importantly for my interpretation, Kant also identifies “perpetual peace” as the end to 
which all states should progress towards as a distinctively political end, i.e., “the 
highest political good”.  
 
To be sure, Kant does not always keep these levels of the discussion apart, but 
from the outset, at least in his political philosophy, he embarks on an analysis that 
does not dissolve the empirical, existing tensions within civil society, but rather 
incorporates them in a realistic conception of politics, where conflict and the 
necessary means of coercion to control it becomes an essential part of his doctrine. 
Similarly, he argues for the possibility of the compatibility of principles of right and 
empirical politics, if right is not to be reduced to a mere empty idea.  
 
We read in Perpetual Peace that: “[I]f we consider it absolutely necessary to 
couple the concept of right with politics, or even to make it a limiting condition of 
politics, it must be conceded that the two are compatible”.263 Thus, in the manner of 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, Kant combined his idealism with “an anti-idealistic view, if 
not of the whole, at any rate of the origins of mankind or of civil society”,264 adding in 
my view a distinctively Kantian value to the notion of peace as the ongoing 
eradication of conflict.  
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So, for Kant, the highest political good is peace, not freedom, as his more 











It could seem that the arguments I have given above for the Kantian critique of 
revolution, serve to make Kant’s political philosophy more or less a reiteration of 
Hobbes’s original insights. However, while I think that the closeness of their attitudes 
towards state order and the causes that tend to dissolve it is highly revealing, there 
remain fundamental differences in their respective outlooks, which call for scrutiny. 
After all, Kant is presented with a different political and historical situation than that 
of Hobbes, and his critique of revolution springs from, but also exerts its influence 
beyond, his political philosophy. Kant’s critical philosophy has at its heart the 
problem of freedom, and this pivotal notion has, in my opinion, a prominent presence 
throughout the totality of Kant’s philosophy that is absent in Hobbes. However, it is 
precisely in his political philosophy that the notion of freedom as autonomy stands in 






















Chapter III: The Nature of Kant’s Political Thought 
 
In this Chapter, I locate my interpretation of Kant’s political thought and his 
critique of revolution, within the broader context of the Enlightenment. To carry out 
this task, I compare Kant’s views to Reinhart Koselleck’s265 thesis, in order to bring 
to light that Kant is an exception to the radical strands of the Enlightenment. I will 
finally draw some general considerations on the nature of Kant’s political thought. I 
claim that Kant’s conception of the problem of politics, as presented at the outset of 
this study, marks him as a distinctive responsible political thinker, and characterize 
the nature of his political thought along the lines proposed by Sheldon Wolin in his 
discussion of liberalism.
266
 This discussion, I trust, is relevant for two reasons: On the 
one hand, because a clearer positioning of Kant's particular responses to the problem 
of politics, and of the issue of revolution in the universe of the Enlightenment, will 
further highlight the distance he kept from any kind of radicalism and utopianism. On 
the other hand, an analysis of the topic of Kant and liberalism will hopefully also help 
in demarcating the specificity of his political views.  Thus this chapter is aimed at 
reinforcing my arguments of Chapter 1 and 2, and to offer an over-arching view of the 
uniqueness and complexity of Kant’s political thought. 
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3. 1 Kant and the Enlightenment: an exception to Koselleck’s thesis. 
 
 Kant has been often characterized as the paradigmatic thinker of the 
Enlightenment. However, I think that this claim cannot be maintained without certain 
qualifications, once we explore the nature and temper of Kant’s political thought. To 
discuss the point, I will address Reinhart Koselleck’s core thesis on the 
Enlightenment,
267
 in order to argue that Kant is an exception that basically goes 
against, and not an example that corroborates, Koselleck’s picture of the 
Enlightenment as a philosophy marked by Utopian thinking, political irresponsibility, 
and a hypocritical stance on the connection between critique and crisis.  
 
 Throughout this study, I have defended the claim according to which Kant’s 
conception of the problem of politics as the reconciliation between order and freedom, 
permeated the basis of his anti-revolutionary critique. Once again, Kant’s 
commitment to the preservation and continuity of the civil condition, his restricted 
view of participatory politics, and his favoring of a state for the protection of freedom 
and not its maximization, does not seem to fit with the general spirit of the 





 Thus, the most fruitful way I have found to disentangle Kant’s particular 
relation to the philosophical universe of the Enlightenment has been my means of 
contrasting it with Koselleck’s thought-provoking portrayal of this era. According to 
Koselleck, the driving force of the Enlightenment was aimed at directing a moralistic 
critique to the established political order, a critique whose political consequences 
remained concealed from the Enlighteners themselves. In Koselleck’s words: “The 
critical process of the Enlightenment conjured up the crisis in the same measure in 
which the political significance of that crisis remained hidden from it.”269 
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 As I understand the gist of Koselleck’s argument, his portrayal is basically a 
complaint, directed against the general tendency of the Enlightenment to take 
criticism as a “seemingly non-political” tool for their attempt to moralize politics and, 
even more importantly for our present discussion, to conceive of revolution not as 
civil war but as “the fulfillment of moral postulates”, in the manner of the radical 




 Therefore, a central point of Critique and Crisis is to show the importance of 
the emergence of the philosophy of history in the XVIIIth century, as the instrument 
to channel the discontents of this group of thinkers,
271
 based on their identification of 
the fractures between the state and society and between politics and morality. 
 
Koselleck’s driving thesis is thus that, in the course of the separation between 
morality and politics as a result of the end of the religious wars in Europe, and the 
inauguration of the Absolutist State, the individual recoiled into the private space of 
her consciousness as the only sphere from which reality could be judged. It was from 
this perspective that the Enlightenment passed trial against the State, alienated from 
political realities. From this standpoint, the individual becomes “a stranger to reality”, 
viewing the political domain as “a heteronomous definition that can only stand in his 
way”. This process, Koselleck concludes, cultivated an essential clash between 
politics and a newly developed philosophy of history, as the vehicle that was able to 
negate the heteronomous character of politics through “Utopian constructs of the 
future”.272 
If this is indeed a correct picture of the Enlightenment, I fear it is simply not 
possible to make Kant part of it, for two main reasons: First, Kant’s arguments against 
revolution, and his conception of politics more generally, give abundant evidence of 
the connection he saw between private judgment and political action. In this sense, 
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Kant closely detected that the public use of reason has to be harmonized, through 
coercion and state order, with the inherent legitimacy of the extant authorities. 
Secondly, Kant’s solution to the problem of politics through the continuity and 
solidification of the civil condition, in addition to progressive reforms in favor of 
better constitutions, was not conditioned by morality. In this sense, Kant privatized 
morality in the manner of Hobbes, in contrast to the Enlighteners’ intentions to make 
the private sphere the locus of political criticism and the spur for political change. 
 
More specifically, on the issue of the Enlightenment’s philosophy of history, I 
argue that Kant, again, did not on his side use it as a vehicle of self-deception, and his 
thoughts on it cannot be fairly characterized as utopian in Koselleck’s sense. 
According to Koselleck, civil war appeared to the Enlighteners  as “harmless”, being 
justified “by a philosophy of history for which the intended political resolution only 
represented the predictable but inevitable end of a moral process beyond politics.”273 
 
Surely, Kant did manifest at various points of his work a belief in progress and 
the coming about of a state of perpetual peace, based on an appeal to the cunning of 
Reason, and the benevolence of Providence as Nature.
274
 However, in works such as 
Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History he warned us about the “empty 
yearning” for utopia,275 and made it clear in The Contest of Faculties that, though it 
may be considered agreeable “to think up political constitutions which meet the 
requirements of reason…it is foolhardy to put them forward seriously, and punishable 
to incite the people to do away with the existing constitution”.276 
 
It remains no less true that, on the one side, we also find Kant defining his 
times as “the age of criticism”, calling his contemporaries to raise above their self-
incurred immaturity.
277
 On the other side, however, Kant defended a political doctrine 
marked by strict limits on freedom and passive obedience of the sort I have described 
throughout this study. 
 To conclude this section, I think it is right to characterize Kant as a distinctive 
figure, who does not respond to the charges Koselleck attributed to the Enlightenment 
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thinkers in general. More specifically, Kant is part of what Jonathan Israel calls the 
moderate strand of the Enlightenment,
278
 belonging thus to the German, rather than 
the French trend of this tradition.
279
 More than in any other issue, Kant’s views on 
revolution become a clear instance of the responsible character of his political 
thought, concerned not merely with intentions but with likely outcomes of political 
action, and serve as further evidence of Kant’s recognition of the radical potential of 
the Enlightenment’s agenda, as understood and articulated by Koselleck.  
Kant understood the intimate connection underlying critique of the extant 
political order and crisis, that is, the relationship between the basic principles of the 
Enlightenment and the politically destabilizing consequences of their content. This 
recognition on Kant’s part runs contrary to the core of Koselleck’s thesis, according 
to which the Enlighteners’ fascination with criticism remained concealed in the 
“tactical camouflage”280 of political irresponsibility, and in their incapacity to see “the 
historical significance of the process [they] had set in motion”.281  
As I hoped to have shown, Kant’s critique of revolution, and the Hobbesian 
nucleus of his political philosophy more generally, provide ample confirmation of a 
politically responsible position, which discerned the historical significance of the 
process in question, namely, the unleashing of modern revolutions. 
3. 2 Kant and liberalism: 
  
Kant’s political thought has been defended from the extreme ends of the 
political spectrum. His political philosophy has been interpreted –as in this thesis-- as 
mainly cautious and authoritarian in character,
282
 whilst for others “Kant’s democratic 
aspirations are plain” such as to make him a distinct representative of liberalism;283 he 
has even been portrayed as an instance of a “radical democrat in the Marxist 
sense”.284 
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 Given the astonishing discrepancies in opinions regarding the nature of Kant’s 
political views, I think it may be useful to contribute some final thoughts on this issue. 
I have thus far argued for basically three claims: firstly, that Kant has a definite 
understanding of the problem of politics as the attempt to reconcile order and 
freedom. Based on a broadly pessimistic picture of human nature, and a valuation in 
favor of the preservation and continuity of the civil condition over radical forms of 
political change, Kant developed a political doctrine where the safeguard of sovereign 
power in the hands of positive law and the extant authorities, demanded limitations on 
freedom in the form of political obedience, and a reduced space for public 
participation. Secondly, Kant’s critique of revolution must be read as an answer to 
this conception of politics, which accordingly repudiates revolutionary change in the 
light of these commitments. I have tried to show that Kant sees peace and not freedom 
as the highest political good, following Hobbes in highlighting the importance of 
eradicating war and mitigating conflict for the security and stability of the civil 
condition. Finally, in placing Kant in the broader universe of the Enlightenment, I 
argued that his political thought emerges as distinctively responsible, in recognizing 
the potential of paradigmatic tenets of the Enlightenment predominant political trends 
as motivating forces for instability and violent strife. This, Kant realized, ran contrary 
to the real spirit of critique, as a means to create better and more secure spaces for 
freedom, to be exercised within the framework of the law.  
 
 With this in view, the question of the nature of Kant’s political philosophy is 
pertinent to our discussion, in order to tie together the various elements of his thought. 
To this question, I contend that Kant can be considered a “liberal” political thinker of 
a strongly conservative bent. Here I understand “liberal” in a specific sense, as 




Wolin has in my opinion persuasively argued that our present age has, for a 
variety of reasons, “lost touch with the original temper and outlook of liberalism”, and 
hence is willing to accept at face value a caricature that characterizes it as: 
 
[…]Optimistic to the point of naiveté; arrogant in its conviction that human reason 
ought to stand as the sole authority for knowledge and action; bewitched by a vision of history 
as an escalator endlessly moving upwards towards greater progress; and blasphemous in 
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Rightly, I believe, Wolin points out that this caricature is the result of lumping 
together two distinct traditions of political thought: on one hand, Rousseaunian 
democratic radicalism, and on the other genuine liberalism.
287
 The paths of these 
traditions differ “in their contrasting faiths concerning the ability of the human mind 
to fathom reality and to translate the results into practical actions”.288 
 
It is in this second tradition, the tradition of liberalism as “a philosophy of 
sobriety, born in fear, nourished by disenchantment, and prone to believe that the 
human condition was and was likely to remain one of pain and anxiety”,289 where I 
think we should place Kant’s political thought. His assessment of human nature, 
coupled with the political realism of his conception of the juridical condition as 
essentially vulnerable, and a recognition of the consequences that resulted from 
following the utopian and redeeming hope embodied by modern revolutions, are some 
of the reasons why Kant’s political philosophy is closer to the “temper and outlook” 
of genuine liberalism.  
 
This original form of liberalism is the one Wolin tries to distinguish from what 
could be a general understanding of this tradition along the lines of a redistributionist 
state, concerned with matters of social justice and equality. That Kant would not fit 
into this sense of liberalism is confirmed, for example, when he says that: “The 
equality of human beings as subjects of the state is…perfectly consistent with the 
utmost inequality of the mass in the degree of its possessions”,290 and his conception 
of the state as a sphere of equal claims of right, and of equality in respect to the 
authority of the law.  
 
Moreover, this characterization is broad enough to make sense of the fact that 
Kant’s liberalism cannot be of the kind that praises more democratic forms of 
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government, actively promotes political dissent, and respects and encourages civil 
resistance and rebellion against the existing political order. These ideas, as important 
as they are from our contemporary standpoint, were not, as we have seen in this study, 
Kant’s own.  
 
However, it is not my intention here to evaluate the possible limitations of 
Kant’s thought, but hopefully to arrive at a better and fairer understanding of the 
nature of his views. In this sense, Kant was no mere defender of the status quo, but 
rather what Klaus Epstein calls a “Reform Conservative”, to distinguish it from a 
“Reactionary”.291 The defender of the status quo “is fundamentally content with the 
world, whereas the Reform Conservative is restless and the Reactionary embittered”. 
The Reform Conservative “prefers gradual reform, if possible within the existing 
constitutional framework, to violent and rapid change”, and wants to “solve the 
massive problem of adaptation to modernity without any violent break in 
continuity”.292  
 
To conclude, Kant’s liberalism, such as it is, is nurtured by a reformist view of 
political progress, a sober and realist analysis of the capabilities and intentions of 
human beings in their social and political practices, and an essentially conservative 
view which “knows that a stable order structure thrives not on triumphs but on 
reconciliation”.293 I have defined this process of reconciliation, in Kant’s case, as one 
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I am hopeful that the arguments presented in the body of this thesis, can 
reasonably ground the following conclusions: 
 
Firstly, Kant’s critique of revolution stems from two sources: on one side, his 
conception of the problem of politics; and on the other side the Hobbesian 
commitments that underlie his political thought. I argued that Kant defined the 
problem of politics as the reconciliation of order and freedom, or, in other words, as 
the possibility of coexistent freedom under a rightful condition. Based on a 
pessimistic view of human nature according to which the interests and dispositions of 
men, that “evil aspect of human nature which makes coercion necessary” 294 , a 
political and institutional solution was demanded, thus Kant set out to solve the 
political problem without making morality a precondition for its solution. The 
preservation and continuity of the juridical condition requires for Kant a strong 
political authority, capable of sustaining the validity and legitimacy of positive law, 
and capable of eliminating conflicting claims of right. Thus, Kant concludes that the 
highest good of politics is peace, and condemned revolutions on the basis of making 
this end impossible. 
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Secondly, Kant’s critique of revolution is a response to the threat of anarchy 
and of the vacuum of right, and it is also motivated by the uncertain fate of radical 
and violent experiments. In this sense, Kant’s political philosophy in general, and his 
critique of revolution in particular, should be seen as part of a moderate strand of the 
Enlightenment, based on the gradualist and reformist character of his political 
thought. In short, Kant does not belong to the part of Enlightenment described by 
Koselleck, which promoted political revolution under the veil of the moral 
transformation of society. Moreover, the nature of Kant’s political thought can be 
rightly defined as of a conservative liberalism. 
 
Thirdly, the persistence of the disappointment felt by Kant’s radical followers, 
and some of his more contemporary interpreters, can be explained, to a large extent, 
by a refusal to acknowledge Kant’s particular conception of politics, and to read his 
political philosophy from the prism of his moral philosophy. I have argued that the 
Kantian principle of autonomy as well as his optimism regarding the moral progress 
of mankind, are not premises at work in his political doctrine. Part of the 
controversies surrounding Kant’s views results from a tendency to extend our 
democratic aspirations to the actual content of Kant’s thought. 
 
Having reached this point in my thesis, it may usefully be asked whether Kant 
actually rejected all revolutions, and absolutely disowned any presumed right of 
rebellion. My reply to the question has to be: yes, he did, as evidenced by what he 
wrote on the matter, which I have tried to elucidate in this thesis. However, I contend 
that the deepness of his arguments against revolution, based on a responsible 
diagnosis on the fragility of civil security, and the effects of radical political change 
on the stability and continuity of the sphere of right, tell us something important about 
the phenomenon of revolution, which is still a relevant and important concern to 
contemporary debates. 
 
A final question that has been latent throughout this study is the relation 
between my suggested interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy and his moral 
philosophy. It would be an understatement to say that it is a relationship marked by 
deep tensions, and sometimes irreconcilable positions. However, in exploring Kant’s 
critique of revolution, and the Hobbesian roots of his commitments, I can conclude 
that as a political philosopher Kant developed a variety of venues for theorizing 
 78 
matters of right and freedom, which are as interesting and stimulating as the ones we 
find in his moral philosophy. 
  
It is constant in his political writings to find Kant’s depiction of the Ideal 
Republic running parallel to his assessment on our empirical and more or less 
imperfect governments. We also find his defense of authority and strict political 
obedience close to his hopes that, in the long run, the rule of law and a robust public 
sphere of critical and enlightened thinking will finally reign.  
 
What I have not found in Kant is the view his radical followers and his 
disappointed readers have sought to discover in his political philosophy. In my 
opinion, Kant envisions a state for the protection of freedom, and not for its 
maximization, a state where the civil condition is defined as a sphere for the 
legitimate use of rights, thus securing the conditions to exercise freedom in the 
absence of radicalized conflicts. For Kant, this could be achieved independently of 
our moral motives, and the dispositions of a good will. This does not mean, however, 
that the Kantian principles of autonomy, respect, and dignity lose their value in the 
context of the civil condition. On the contrary: it is through the stability of the state 
and the bonding of the social fabric that the individual can flourish as both a moral 
and a political being.  
 
Thus, my final suggestion would be that, in taking seriously the way Kant 
addresses the problem of politics, and allowing for a critical and responsible 
evaluation of his solutions, we gain more rewards than disappointments. It is in this 
sense that I read Kant’s political and moral philosophy running parallel, and not 
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